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<br />- 002105 <br /> <br />In mid-April, National Security Advisor Kissinger sent a <br />memo to President Nixon, endorsing the Brownell report. He <br />also rejected the Executive Office's irrigation efficiency <br />alternative as not permanent.15 The President officially <br />accepted those recommendations on May 5, and appointed <br />Brownell as his chief negotiator. Secretary of State Rogers <br />flew to Mexico City to present the U.S. position to <br />President Echeverria on May 13. <br /> <br />On June 8, Brownell was accorded Ambassadorial rank. <br />Negotiations took place through the summer. Brownell and <br />the State Department kept Congressional leaders and the <br />Committee of Fourteen informed of the progress of talks. <br />Oddly, there was no official disclosure of the Brownell <br />recommendations until the new Minute was signed. <br /> <br />Minute No. 242, guaranteeing Mexico that its treaty <br />deliveries would have an average annual salinity level no <br />more than 115 ppm higher than that at Imperial Dam (plus or <br />minus 30 ppm), was signed on August 30, 1973.16 <br /> <br />I <br />... <br /> <br />The Leqislative History of P.L. 93-320 <br /> <br />As soon as the Minute was officially signed, the Departments <br />of Interior and State began to draft implementing <br />legislation. Because of differences in drafting style, <br />progress was slow. It was further impeded by arguments <br />between Interior and OMB over such issues as how the <br />desalting plant should be procured and who should have <br />responsibility for its construction. <br /> <br />OMB feared that the plant would set a precedent for <br />Federally-funded public-works-style solutions to water <br />quality problems (as indeed its supporters hoped it would). <br />The agency insisted that the Secretary of State, acting <br /> <br />14 <br />