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00216n For three weeks in September, the Working Group heard presentations on the international legal issues, and debated the merits of various positions. Then, as Herbert Brownell and Samuel Eaton noted in a 1975 article, these questions were set aside.8 certainly the State Department's desire for a negotiated settlement that would avoid the possibility of litigation in an international court played a part in this decision, but the orders came from the head of the National Security Council--Henry Kissinger. The National Security Council was the only concerned agency in the Executive Office of the President that was not represented on the Task Force or Working Group, despite Kissinger's well-known interest in Mexico. As National Security Advisor, he must have been involved in briefing Nixon for the Echeverria visit and in preparation of the joint communique of June. But his position on the issues and his role were unknown to others in the Executive Office. ., On September 26, the office of Assistant Secretary of Interior James Smith received a message from the NSC: the salt balance approach of Minute No. 241 was to be an interim solution only. The final solution would require elimination of the effects of Wellton-Mohawk on salinity levels.9 The State Department presumably received the same message. But most members of the Working Group and Task Force remained unaware of the change in policy. Kissinger's directive--to eliminate the effects of Well ton-Mohawk on water deliveries to Mexico--reduced the allowable salinity differential at Morelos Dam to about 100 ppm. (Because all return flows from the project were being bypassed under Minute No. 241, this was the salinity level the Mexicans were experiencing at the time.) It cut off legal arguments over parity and salt balance. And it greatlY narrowed the range of options available to improve water quality. 9