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001111 one of supply. It is of no consequence to the appropriator below whether the water supplied to him comes from Ruxton creek or from some other tributary to the Fountain; this is entirely immaterial so long as his supply is adequate. When it is lessened by junior appropriators to his injury, he has cause to complain no matter whether the diminution results from suoh appropriators taking the water direct from the Fountain, or from some of its tributaries before it reaches the main stream., 2. Upon the next proposition plaintiff in error insists th~t a water-rigJrl; o"nnot be transferred by sale separate from t he land. The question thus raised is one of the first impression in this court. Its importanoe is apparent. In Fuller v. Swan River Mining Co., 12 Colo. 12, a nearer approaoh was made to its oonsideration than in any other decided case. It was held that one who has the right by appropriation to divert the waters of a stream may ohange the place of diversion and also the plaoe of use. This disposes of plaint1ff's oontention that the water is only appropriated for a particular tract of land and that the appropriation will not hold for any other; for although the decision is based upon diversion for mining purposes, no reason is peroeived why the rule in re- ference to appropriations for agricultural uses should not be the saJOO, the requirement in all oases being that the water diverted from the stream shall be applied to a beneficial use. . After reviewing the authorities the court saidl"It seems to be well settled by these decisions that a prior appropriator of water from a stream may change the point of diversion and the place of use without affecting his right of pri- ority, and all the cases reviewed, exoept the case of Davis v. Gale, 32 Cal. 27, makes the right to make suoh ohange dependent upon the oondi tion that the change shall not injuriously affeot others. Vie think that the rule announced in Kidd v. Laird, 15 Cal. 162, 'that, in the ' absence of injurious consequenoes to others, any change whioh the party chooses to make is legal and proper;' is the only rule which under the rights of the prior lltlpropriator oan be fully exercised, and his rights, and the rights of all other persons fully protected. The right to change, so limited, includes the point of diversion, and place and chcraoter of use." The rule as thus stated seems to be fair to all parties conoerned. If A. is the owner of one hundred and sixty acres of land with a water-right for only eighty aores, it may be of great benefit to him to chance the place of use as the soil upon a portion of the tract becomes exhausted or impoverished by the raising of orops. To deny the right to change the place of use under such circumstances would result in injury to the prior appropriator with no corresponding benefit to others. The wisdom of the rule in Fuller v. The Swan River Company is apparent when applied in suoh a case. .And no reason is perceived why, if the plaoe of use may be changed to a traot adjoining the one in connection with whioh the priority came into existenoe, it may not as well be changed to a piece of land at a greater distance. The principle permitting the first change to be made being established, the exeroise of the right cannot be made to depend upon the locus of the use, provided the rights of others are not injuriously affeoted by the change. The authority for changing the place of use from one part of a quarter seotion of land to another plaoe upon the same quarter section will per- mit the purohase of land elsewhere and utilizing the water in its cultivation. Thus if the owner of lB.:!:d near Ruxton creek with a water-right therefor may "5-