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Last modified
1/26/2010 10:48:17 AM
Creation date
10/9/2006 1:58:25 AM
Metadata
Fields
Template:
Water Supply Protection
File Number
8272
Description
Colorado River - Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Program - CRBSCP
State
CO
Basin
Colorado Mainstem
Water Division
5
Date
9/1/1991
Author
Anne DeMarsay
Title
Brownell Task Force and the Mexican Salinity Problem - A Narrative Chronology of Events
Water Supply Pro - Doc Type
Report/Study
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<br />u \... /. :J A. r--- - - - n <br /> <br />Daniel F. Lawrence <br />Utah <br /> <br />The chief purpose of the Committee of Fourteen is to consult on matters <br />regarding the 1944 Water Treaty with Mexico. I became involved in the Brownell <br />Task Force and the negotiations culminating in Minute No. 242 when [then- <br />Chairman from Arizona] Wes Steiner convened the Committee at the request of <br />mwc Commissioner Friedkin. <br /> <br />The 1944 Water Treaty was developed With input from the Basin States, all of <br />whom wanted to maintain the sanctity of the 1922 Colorado River Compact. <br />When we first heard about the Task Force, which was under the direction of the <br />State Department, we were alarmed that an agency with a different perspective <br />[than mwC] might be tempted to give water away to satisfy Mexican concerns. <br />Stealing our upstream storage for dilution was certainly a prominent option. <br />While we had reluctantly allowed use. of stored water as a temporary measure <br />[under Minutes No. 218 and 241], we were absolutely opposed to it as a long-term <br />solution. <br /> <br />During the period when the Task Force was working, we met with them several <br />times as a group; I had no private contact with them. I remember that the Task <br />Force did tour the area. The Committee also held several meetings :with <br />"'IJfPf .Commissioner Friedkin during which he briefed us on the progress of the Task <br />Force and later the negotiations, and consulted with us on various issues. These <br />meetings, like other meetings that were not limited to the states alone, were <br />usually attended by representatives of the Bureau of Reclamation and the Office <br />of Saline Water. <br /> <br />The solution recommended by President Nixon reflects the states' tough lobbYing <br />job against the use of upstream storage. Building a desalting plant appeared to <br />be the only other choice. The nonstructural alternative [partial buy-out and <br />improving irrigation efficiency at Wellton-Mohawk] would have affected farmers <br />in Arizona, and their representatives opposed it. There was also some question <br />about its effectiveness, both in our eyes and those of the Mexicans. After all, <br />Mexican acceptance of the terms of Minute No. 242 was based on their appraisal <br />of how it would benefit them. <br /> <br />Desalting was more popular then, too. There was some euphoria about the new <br />technology, and the cost estimates for the plant were far, far below reality. No <br />one was looking closely at the numbers or the potential problems. You can't ask <br />why people agreed to spend $400 million on a desalting plant-they didn't. <br /> <br />As to Minute No. 242, it is based on salt balance. The figure of 115 ppm was just <br />hammered out, and the .:1:.30 ppm to allow leeway, We didn't believe the Mexican <br /> <br />brownell,rpt <br /> <br />B-5 <br /> <br />September 1991 <br />
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