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c-~- 6 ,-,::J~ Myron B. Holburt California My involvement with the Mexican salinity problem goes back to the mid-1960s. I joined the Colorado River Board in August 1965, and attended Committee of Fourteen meetings after that date. Shortly after I became, Chief Engineer in. March 1968, the Governor appointed me a member of the Committee. As far as the Committee's initial position, everyone had decided to support Well ton-Mohawk Rationally, I think Arizona would have been better off without the project, but there was a lack of urban influence at the time. No one spoke up for the Central Arizona Project. If Arizona had supported the purchase of land from farmers in the Wellton-Mohawk District by the U.S., there would have been a more dependable water supply for CAP. Everyone on the Committee was, of course, opposed to any continuing use of upstream storage water unless it was replaced. The Committee of Fourteen met several times with Ambassador Brownell, Sam Eaton, and the Task Force. Some of the Task Force and Working Group members talked to me privately-I remember talking to Sam Eaton, Pat O'Meara, :Jim Smith, and Jan van Schilfgaarde-but our conversations were usually at mneetings. I did tour the Yuma area with Brownell-I think most of the Committee _ of Fourteen were there. As I recall, the Bureau of Reclamation led the tour, and its representatives' talked mostly about technological solutions to the salinity problem. The real force behind the choice of a desalting plant as a solution to the salinity problem Mexico seemed to be the State Department. Once Echeverria made salinity a major issue, the State Department found it attractive. Here was a . problem they could solve by spending money-unlike other major problems like drugs, trade; and immigration. Brownell was a very good politician who realized the influence of the Committee of Fourteen, and promised that the solution wouldn't cost the states money or water. He did not believe that there was any practical alternative. At one time the U.S. talked about improving the agricultural systems in the Mexicali Valley [to reduce the effects of salinity] but the Mexicans would not agree to this as a potential solution. There were supposed to be groundwater agreements, too, but they never materialized either. Because of the State Department's strong interest, Brownell went ahead with the negotiation of the Minute [No. 242] even though there were some unsettled issues with the states-replacement of the brine stream, and providing power for the desalting plant and the groundwater pumping along the border. The figure of 115 ppm plus or minus 30 ppm was drawn from historical data-a weighted average of brownell,rpt B-3 Septe,mber 1991