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PROJ00517
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Last modified
2/3/2010 11:05:06 AM
Creation date
10/5/2006 11:59:13 PM
Metadata
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Template:
Loan Projects
Contract/PO #
C153377
Contractor Name
Lord, W. B. and Associates
Water District
0
County
Weld
Larimer
Bill Number
XB 99-999
Loan Projects - Doc Type
Contract Documents
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<br />.' <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />Tudor Engineering <br /> <br />Page 2 <br /> <br />the potential effects of load management and diversity exchange policies <br />upon future demand for peaking power may have been underestimated in area <br />utility forecasts, and (c) the seasonal peak demand for electricity in the <br />Tri-State area may decline as groundwater pumping for irrigation purposes <br />is reduced due to energy costs and declining water levels. <br /> <br />The price for peaking power is an obvious element in determining how <br />much of such power will be consumed. The utility load projections used by <br />Tudor to confirm the existence of effective demand do not include explicit <br />consideration of this price. However, the long-run marginal cost of <br />peaking power implicit in the Tudor calculations is 203 mills/kwh <br />(composite rate with fuel price escalation, or 190 mills without fuel price <br />escalation). There is reasonable doubt that peaking power demand would <br />grow at the 5 percent rate projected by the utilities and Tudor if peaking <br />power were to be priced at Tudor's estimated long-run marginal cost. In <br />fact, it is not unreasonable to suppose that peaking power demand might not <br />grow at all if such very large rate increases were to occur. <br /> <br />It is true that utilities in this area do not now price power, and <br />particularly peaking power, at its long-run marginal cost. There are, <br />however, indications that future power pricing will move in this direction, <br />due to the influence of the buy-back provisions of PURPA and the general <br />trend of regulatory authorities to strive for economically rational energy <br />production and consumption. But even if this change does not occur, and <br />the peaking power load growth necessary to justify a Cache La Poudre <br />peaking plant is realized, it would then be improper to calculate benefits <br />at the 203 mill rate used by Tudor when the power produced is, in fact, <br />marketed at a lower rate. This would constitute a violation of the <br />willingness to pay principle of benefit estimation which is incorporated in <br />my guidelines. <br />
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