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<br />2. Costs of failure; and <br /> <br />3. Costs of preventing failure. <br /> <br />Use of risk analysis has been advocated in engineering for <br />dams, especially in areas such as determining spillway capacity <br />and design for earthquake resistance. since the magnitudes of <br />future floods or earthquakes to which a dam will be exposed in <br />its service life are largely indeterminate, past and current <br />design decisions involving these and similar indeterminate <br />loadings are based on accepted, albeit somewhat arbitrary, <br />standards. Risk analysis has been advocated as a rational <br />approach to such problems to avoid potentially costly over- <br />designs or underdesigns in dams. The most significant <br />deterrent to use of the risk analysis approach has been the <br />difficulty of assigning probabilities to the phenomena involved <br />in dam failures. <br /> <br />Use of risk analysis techniques was considered in a 1985 <br />study entitled Safety of Dams - Flood and Earthquake criteria <br />(Reference 10), sponsored by the Department of the Army and <br />the Department of the Interior. As noted in Appendix 6, the <br />Federal Emergency Management Agency also has sponsored research <br />and training in application of risk analysis to dams. other <br />research efforts in use of risk analysis have been reported by <br />the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation. <br /> <br />About half of the Federal agency reports indicate that <br />rough consideration of relative risks is part of the process of <br />establishing agency priorities for activities such as dam <br />inspections and rehabilitation work. The Soil Conservation <br />service reports that considerations of risk are part of <br />current studies of dam safety standards. The Bureau of <br />Reclamation has conducted training workshops on risk analysis <br />techniques for its staff. <br /> <br />Dam Failures and Other Safetv-related Incidents <br /> <br />Table 3 summarizes the dam failures and other serious dam <br />safety-related incidents reported by the Federal agencies as <br />occurring in the period from January 1980 through September <br />1985. In a few instances, the listing of individual incidents <br />in specific columns of Table 3 may be in error, as the Federal <br />agency reports did not indicate clearly in all cases whether <br />the dam involved actually failed or whether the dam was in <br />Federal or non-Federal ownership. As the Federal agencies <br />only reported incidents at non-Federal dams in which the <br />respective agencies had some interests, it is reasonable to <br />assume that there were more -- probably many more -- failures <br />and dam safety-related incidents at non-Federal dams that are <br />not listed on Table 3. <br /> <br />Chapter 3 - page 26 <br />