<br />
<br />418
<br />
<br />ROGER A. PIELKE. JR.
<br />
<br />NINE FALLACIES OF FLOODS
<br />
<br />419
<br />
<br />perature variability. and a more active hydrological cycle, including the possibility
<br />of more floods (see IPee, 1996a,b, on the science and impacts associated with
<br />~Iimate change).
<br />One result of scientific and political concern about the possibility of global
<br />warming is a frequent association by the media and the public of almost every
<br />extreme weather event with global warming. For instance, the cover of Newsweek
<br />from 22 January 1996 carried the following title: 'THE HOT ZONE: Blizzards.
<br />Floods. and Hurricanes: Blame Global Warming'. This article, and others like
<br />il. carry the implication thaI global warming is responsible for recent climatic
<br />extremes. In fUl.:t. it is essenlially impossible lo attribute ally particular weather
<br />event to global warming. At the regional level scientists have documented various
<br />increasing and decreasing trends in the frequency or magnitude of extreme events,
<br />but are not able to associate those changes to global warming. Globally it is diffi.
<br />cult for scientists to discern recent trends in extreme events. As the IPCC (1996a,
<br />p, 173) notes:
<br />Overall, there is no evidence that extreme weather events, or climate vari-
<br />ability, has increased, in a global sense, through the 20th century, although
<br />data and analyses are poor and not comprehensive. On regional scales there is
<br />clear evidence of changes in some extremes and climate variability indicators.
<br />Some of these changes have been toward greater variability; some h~ve been
<br />toward lower variability.
<br />Does the lack of a linkage between extreme weather events and global warming
<br />mean that the public and policy makers need not concern themselves with climate
<br />change? On the contrary; there are many reasons for the public and policymakers to
<br />have an increasing concern about the impacts of extreme events. And this concern
<br />is largely independent of the global warming hypothesis, for the following reasons.
<br />Current knowledge is limited as to the potential impacts of a changing climate
<br />on the number and intensity of hydrologic flood events (lPCC, 1996a; OTA, 1993;
<br />Dracup and Kendall, 1990). It is certain that for particular regions and communities
<br />the climate will change in some way or another. There will likely be some regions
<br />thaI experience more flood events and others thaI experience less. It will almost
<br />certainly be more straightforward to document these changes than to attribute them
<br />to specific: causes such as human-caused global warming. For example, several
<br />regions in the Upper Mississippi River Basin have seen trends (at 80% and 90%
<br />confidence for different regions) of increasing precipitation since 1965 (Bhowmik
<br />et aI., 1994). Meanwhile, the Colorado river basin has seen a decrease in streamflow
<br />over the latter two thirds of the twentieth century (Frederick and Kneese, 1990).
<br />Such 'winners and losers' have been documented in regions and nations around
<br />the world (e,g.. Rao. 1995; Karl et aI., 1995), In the United States (about 6% of
<br />the Earth's land surface), recent decades have seen an increasing trend (at vario~s
<br />levels of confidence) in precipitation in certain regions and also streamflow (Kunkel
<br />et aI., 1997; Karl et aI., 1996; Lins and Michaels, 1994). But it is not clear that more
<br />precipitation (or changed frequencies of precipitation events) in the United States
<br />
<br />are the cause of the documented increase in losses in recent decades; other factors
<br />(such as human occupancy of flood plains, land use change, channel engineering,
<br />nonstructural mitigation policies, etc.) must also be taken into account to arrive at
<br />a final detennination of the relation of climate and impacts.
<br />There are at least three implications of the uncertain climate future for societal
<br />responses to floods. First, there is a continued need to document how climate has
<br />changed in the past. So much atternion is focused on developing better predictions
<br />of the future that we often neglect the wealth of data about the past. Second, there
<br />is a need to systematically evaluate successes and failures in responding to past
<br />climatic extremes. While we do not know exactly what the fUlUre will bring, we do
<br />in many cases know that our responses to past events has been less than optimal.
<br />Thus, at a minimum we should take care to ensure that we are at least prepared to
<br />deal with the variability and extremes that have already occurred and been docu-
<br />mented (Glantz, 1988). Finally, the uncertainty in the climate future underscores
<br />the need to better understand the societal dimensions of the climate threat and to
<br />take those adaptive measures that make sense based on our imperfect knowledge of
<br />the certain past and uncertain future. A first step in that effort is to better understand
<br />societal exposure to variability and extreme events.
<br />No matter what the climate future holds, flood impacts on society may continue
<br />to get worse. A study conducted by the U.S. Congressional Office of Technology
<br />Assessment concluded that 'despite recent efforts, vulnerability to flood damages
<br />is likely to continue to grow' (OTA, 1993, p. 253). The study based this conclusion
<br />on the following factors, which have very little to do with climate:
<br />
<br />I. Populations in and adjacent to flood-prone areas, especially in coastal areas,
<br />continue to increase, putting more property and greater numbers of people at
<br />risk,
<br />
<br />2. flood-moderating wetlands continue to be destroyed,
<br />
<br />3. little has been done to control or contain increased runoff from upstream
<br />development (e.g., runoff caused by paving over land),
<br />
<br />4. many undeveloped areas have not yet been mapped (mapping has been con-
<br />centrated in alre'ady-developed areas), and people are moving into-such areas
<br />without adequate information concerning risk,
<br />
<br />5. many dams and levees are beginning to deteriorate with age, leaving property
<br />owners with a false sense of security about how well they are protected,
<br />
<br />6. some policies (e.g., provision of subsidies for building roads and bridges) tend
<br />to encourage development in flood plains.
<br />
<br />At a minimum, when people blame climate change for damaging flood events, they
<br />direct attention away from the fact that decision makers already have the means at
<br />their disposal to significantly address the documented U.S. flood problem.
<br />
|