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1. The V~lidity of Zoning The ability of flood plain zoning in general is not particu- larly vulnerable to attack. It is provided by statute in connection with general county police powers that the zoning is within the pOlice power. C.R.S. 1963, Sec. 106-2-l4 (Supp. 1967). In addition, the authorizing legislation for the Urban Drainage District describes the general police power necessity for the district, C.R.S. 1963, Sec. 69-21-2 (Supp. 1969), and specifically delegates the power to adopt flood plain "oning, C.R.S. 1963, Sec. 89-21-23 (7) (Supp. 1969). The normal presumption of statutory validity, together with the common sense importance of protection against property damage and personal harm would surely answer any general police power question. residential to business zones, all involving large diff~r- cnces in the owners' land value, the zoning was upheld. One is not necessarily entitled to the highest use of the oroperty, so long as every reasonable use is not prohibited. The basic principle of Denver Buick, which is based on Justice Holmes' theory ~n penns~lvania Coal, supra, seems to be the diminution in value t eory - zoning so severe as to seriously reduce the value of property amounts to a taking, The Colorado cases after Denver Buick have left the principle intact but have evolved a requ~rement of a degree of . . diminution so large as to be almost total. The test ~s whether there is any reasonable use of the land remaining. Any attack on the zoning validity would probably follow a narrower approach. It is required that any particular ZOning ordinance and its application must have a minimum rational connection to a valid police power objective, Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), and must not be so restr~ct~ve as to amount to a taking or a compensa- tion, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 u.s. 393 (1922). In one out-of-state case, a part~cular application of flood- plain zoning was invalidated as being confiscatory, Dooley v. Town Plan and zonint Com'n of Town of Fairfield, 151 Conn. 304, 197 A. 2d 770 ( 964). In that case, the zoning permitted uses of parks, playgrQunds, clubhouses, or marinas, but the land which was a broad flood and tidal plain was not suitably attractive or close to the water for these purposes. The court conCluded that for all practical purposes the use of the land had been rendered impossible, There is a very good reason, however, why flood-plain zoning along and closely conforming to a natural channel is not confiscatory. That is that the land was already burdened with a natural drainage easement in favor of upstream land- owners or the public at large, Ambrosio v. Perl-Mack Construction Co., supra. Uses of the land incons~stent w~th that easement were not feasible before the zoning. As long as the zoning is for no enlarged purpose and prohibits basically no more than the natural easement, there can be no taking. Colorado view toward confiscatory zoning is set out in and Count of Denver v. Denver BuiCk, 141 Colo. 12l, P.2 I 6 There, a ccrta~n zoning ordinance classified areas adjacent to the downtown area with the restriction that off-street parking must be provided with any neW development. Chief Justir.;e O. Otto Muore found it to be simply too much, agreed with the trial court that it was "confiscatory, unreasonable, discriminatory, oppressive amI unconstitutional," and struck the oICdinance. The opinion is broad and has not been closely followed. In special situations along the channel, however, questions still remain. At the small on-stream reservoirs and the public street crossings, the flood profile is actually widened beyond its historic channel for a comparable frequency flood. Just what the exact boundaries of the natural easement are has not been clearly determined by any case. Indeed, the propriety of encasing the modified civil law drainage con- cept into a rigid form of easement is suspect. It is the nature of things that some flood will occur in the future, however remote, that will surpass the size of the last known laroe flood. For this reason the actual extent of the drainage channel is indeterminate. In addition, although the natural easement conce t is a ood one to descr~be the u ~c s r~ .ts t e c~t or t e ~str~ct as to ta e t e c ann" as ~t ~n s ~t, not ~n ~ts pr~st~ne natura con ~tion. Art~f~c~al obstruct~ons ~n the channel ~n fact exist and for perfectly valid purposes. It would seem entirely reasonable and necessary for the flood plain zOne boundaries to follow the actual high water line even where there is artificial widening. In Baum v. Dcnver, 147 Colo. 104, 363 P.2d 688 (1961), Denver v. American o~l Co., 150 Colo. 341, 374 P.2d 357 (1%2), Colby v. Board of Adjustment of Denver, 81 Colo. 344, 255 P. 443 (1927). C~ty of Colo. Sprgs. v. Miller, 95 Colo. 337, 36 P.2d 161 (1934), and Hoskinson v. City of Arvada, 136 Colo. 450, 319 P.2d 1090 (19581, all inv(Jlv~ng ilttempted rezonings from The problem of artificial widening is different at different locations. Where the widening is caused by a reservoir, the problem is essentially moot. The reservoir will or Should have an easement or OWnership to cover the entire bed of the reservoir for reservoir purposes, and there is nO change in the use of the rcscrvoir bed when storm flows arc occasionally 5 ,