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Land mine Page 11 ot 2U would top $700, Wyman said. "It could have been a barn-burner if it had ever happened," he said. The clash with the SEe and the company's growing financial problems all but eliminated Galactic's ability to cover costs by selling stock, company memos indicated. http://www.denver-rmn.comlnews/0507 smrnt l.shtml 517100 Richard J. Stoehr, a member of Galactic's board of directors, suggested in a memo that "the fastest and best way to build with limited funds is to develop a prospect with little or no perceived value into one with great perceived value, then capitalize on that position. "Our chairman is a master at this," Stoehr wrote in the memo, which was addressed to a fellow board member. But other executives and some investors had begun worrying about Friedland's freewheeling management style and the company's informal decision-making structure. On Nov. 2, 1990, Friedland severed ties to Galactic. He said it was because the company was maturing and needed people with more mining experience. "I'm a start-up sort of guy, and I'm a financial investor, but I never pretended to be a mining man, and so I was anxious to pursue other pastures," he told the News. Friedland denied leaving because of questions about criminal liability under federal clean water laws, which were beginning to concern Galactic executives as much as the company's money woes. At the time of the first cyanide leaks in 1986, Galactic had retained a Denver attorney who specialized in environmental law. In 1990, the lawyer, Dean Massey, flew to Vancouver and warned Galactic directors that something must be done about the water building up behind the dike and the acid drainage.