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<br /> <br />THE FLOOD AFTERMATH <br /> <br />57 <br /> <br /> <br />FIGURE 49.-Flood warning sign at the downstream entrance to the Big Thompson River Canyon near Loveland, Colo. <br /> <br />It also summarizes studies by Graham and Brown <br />(1983) and Jack Truby (Colorado Division of Disaster <br />Emergency Services, written commun., 1983). <br /> <br />THE HUMAN ELEMENT <br /> <br />There were three fatalities; all three victims, whose <br />ages ranged from 21 to 36 years, lived outside Colorado. <br />One victim, while sleeping at a Roaring River campsite, <br />did not survive the "wall of water" and debris. Two <br />other campers at Aspenglen Campground died from the <br />flooding, although they had been warned of an ap- <br />proaching flood (but not a dam failure) by fellow <br />campers. Apparently, these two campers misjudged the <br />magnitude of the flooding when they walked back into <br />the flood area to retrieve camping gear. <br />Several factors kept the number of fatalities low. The <br />time of day, as well as the clear and dry weather, was <br />nearly optimal for minimal loss of life. Had the dam <br />failed during the night, the public would not have been <br />able to respond as quickly to the warnings. Although. <br />the flood had traveled 4.5 mi before being detected by <br />Stephen Gillette at Horseshoe Falls, a rapid dissemina- <br />tion of warning was made within minutes by National <br /> <br />Park Service, Larimer County Sheriff, Estes Park <br />police, and KSIR radio. The warning also spread rapid- <br />ly because of the clustering of motels, businesses, and <br />homes that had access to major roads. The majority of <br />the public responded quickly to the flood warning. This <br />was possibly because of their previous experience with <br />the 1976 flash flood in the nearby Big Thompson River <br />canyon (McCain and others, 1979) which killed at least <br />139 people and resulted in $35 million in damages, and <br />because of warning signs placed along the river canyons <br />in Colorado (fig. 49). Also, the flood wave traveled <br />relatively slowly (an average of 3.9 mi/h), aided by <br />the retarding effect of Horseshoe Park, enabling most <br />people who did not receive a warning but heard the loud <br />noise, or saw the leading edge of the flood, to walk or <br />run to higher ground. <br /> <br />THE DAMAGE <br /> <br />The Colorado Division of Disaster Emergency Serv- <br />ices estimated total damages to be approximately $30.7 <br />million. A summary of damage estimates is given in <br />table 13, including public and private losses to struc- <br />tures, cleanup of debris, and economic losses. Business, <br />physical damage. and economic injury losses of almost <br />