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<br />-'"
<br />
<br />Project No. 4024-001, et~. -9-
<br />
<br />... to perform any and all acts, and to
<br />prescribe, issue, make, amend and rescind
<br />such orders, rules and regulations as it
<br />may find necessary or appropriate to carry
<br />out the provisions of this [Act] ." ~I
<br />It is well established that the Commission's powers include
<br />by implication the unstated but requisite authority in order to
<br />effectively discharge its mandate. "The [Federal Power] Act is
<br />not to be given a tight reading wherein every action of the
<br />Commission is justified only if referrable to express statutory
<br />authorization. On the contrary, the Act is one that entrusts
<br />a broad subject-matter to administration by the Commission,
<br />subject to Congressional oversight, in the light of new and
<br />evolving problems and doctrines." Niaqara Mohawk Power Corp. v.
<br />Federal Power Comm1ssion, 379 F.2d 153, 158 (D.C. Cir. 1967). l!/
<br />Indeed, when the Commission "is exercising powers entrusted
<br />to it by Congress, it may have recourse to equitable considerations
<br />in striving for the reasonableness that broadly identifies the
<br />ambit of sound discretion. Conceptions of equity are not
<br />a special province of courts and may properly be invoked by the
<br />[Commiss ion ... .1" ~/ Moreover, the "presumpt ion favori ng
<br />agency expertise in the selection of remedies is given full
<br />e{fect when the [Commission] makes a conscious selection ...,
<br />provided reasons for its conclusions are stated or may fairly
<br />be discerned," Q/ as we have done here.
<br />
<br />Accordingly, Uncompahgre's petition is denied in all
<br />respects.
<br />
<br />E. We now turn to the issues raised by the other pleadings.
<br />In his application for rehearing, Wilcox asks that the
<br />Com~ission clarify the time which begins the one year suspension
<br />perlod should Uncompahgre fail to rebut the presumption. Wilcox
<br />
<br />~/ 16 O.S.C. S825h (1976).
<br />
<br />~/ See, Mesa Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 441 F.2d 182, 187 (5th Cir.
<br />1971); Public Service Commission v. FPC, 327 F.2d 893 896-97
<br />(D.C. Cir. 1964); Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 142
<br />F.2d 943,952 (lOth Cir. 1944), aff'd 324 U.S. 581 (1945).
<br />~I City of Chicago v. FPC, 385 F.2d 629, 642-43 (D.C. Cir.
<br />1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 945 (l968).
<br />
<br />23/ International Union of Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers v.
<br />NLRB, 426 F.2d 1243, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
<br />400 U.S. 950 (1970).
<br />
<br />......",
<br />
<br />'--;
<br />
<br />Project No. 4024-001, et al. -10-
<br />
<br />also suggests that the Commission stay the effectiveness of the
<br />suspension period pending judicial review. ~/
<br />
<br />When we discussed the one year period in our September 21
<br />order, we intended that the time would not start until a final
<br />order dealing with the merits of the proceeding was issued. Our
<br />Order on Abuse was preliminary and in the nature of an order to
<br />show cause. The suspension period thus begins upon the issuance
<br />of this order. We reject wilcox's suggestion for a stay, however.
<br />In the first place, it is premature to presume that judicial
<br />review of the order will be sought. Second, even if it were,
<br />wilcox has not demonstrated in light of our responsibility for
<br />prompt development, that the interests of justice would be served
<br />by essentially suspending any further action with respect to this
<br />site.
<br />
<br />.
<br />
<br />Both wilcox and Energenics claim that they should be made
<br />whole and ask that the Commission issue them the permits which
<br />they were denied in the earlier permit proceedings because of the
<br />City's preference. ~I
<br />
<br />We believe that wilcox and Energenics were compromised
<br />by the arrangement between the City and uncompahgre. However,
<br />we also cannot ignore the likelihood that there were other
<br />prospective candidates who were similary compromised, but who
<br />did not even file because of the City's accorded preference. 26/
<br />We see no overriding equitable basis to prefer applicants who--
<br />actually filed competing applications previously over those who
<br />were understandably discouraged from doing so due to the presence
<br />of a municipal competitor. Furthermore, the public interest
<br />would be best served by allowing the broadest field of competing
<br />proposals. Our intent in imposing the sanction here involved is
<br />to take action against those who entered into or assisted in an
<br />
<br />24/ By this order, we are approving wilcox's notice of Withdrawal
<br />of Pleadings, filed May 4, 1983, and dismissing his permit
<br />application for project No. 6439.
<br />
<br />~/ Wilcox believes that the Commission should not reopen the
<br />sites for competition until he determines what he wants
<br />to do with his pending application. However, our decision
<br />here in accepting wilcox's withdrawal will also result in
<br />the dismissal of his permit application. On the other hand,
<br />Energenics maintains that the City's permits should be void
<br />ab initio and the permits for which Energenics applied
<br />should be granted forthwith.
<br />
<br />.
<br />
<br />~/ For example, we note that the City of Duchesne, Utah had
<br />filed a notice of intent to file a license application,
<br />although the notic~ was later withdrawn. See 24 FERC
<br />1161,317 at p. 61,682 (1983). ~
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