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<br />September 1983 <br />Page 3 <br /> <br />e <br /> <br />3. <br /> <br />Taking. <br /> <br />e <br /> <br />The Fifth Amendment to the U. S . Constitution <br />provides that private property cannot be taken by the federal <br />government without just compensation. The Colorado Consti- <br />tution also prohibits the taking of private property for <br />public use in Article II, ! 15. A zoning ordinance may be <br />challenged on the ground that the restrictions placed on the <br />use of the property are so severe as to constitute a taking. <br />There have been several cases in which floodplain zoning <br />ordinances were challenged as an unconstitutional taking. In <br />Dooley ~ ~ Planning and Zoning Commission 2i ~ ~ of <br />Fairheld, 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964), the court <br />found that a floodplain zoning ordinance had restricted land <br />use to the point where the landowner had no reasonable or <br />practical means of obtaining income or a return from his <br />property. The court held that even though the purpose of the <br />ordinance was laudable, the plaintiff had been deprived of <br />any worthwhile rights or benefits in his land and therefore <br />the ordinance was an unconstitutional taking. <br /> <br />More recent cases have taken a completely different <br />approach to the taking issue. Courts have looked at the <br />purpose of the zoning ordinance in question. If the purpose <br />of the restriction is to create a public benefit, then the <br />ordinance constitutes a taking which can only be done through <br />eminent domain. If, however, the purpose of the restriction <br />is to prevent a public harm, then the ordinance will not be <br />considered a taking regardless of the use restrictions placed <br />on.a landowner's property. Note, also, that in determining <br />the purposes of the use restrictions courts have looked to <br />the enumerated purposes stated in the zoning ordinance. This <br />approach was taken in Usdin v. state of New Jersev Dept. of <br />Environmental protection, 173--N.J. super. Ct. Law Div. 31r; <br />414 A.2d 280 (1980); Just v. Marinette county, 56 Wis.2d 7, <br />201 N.W.2d 761 (1972); and TUrn~ike Realty Company ~ ~ 2i <br />Dedham, 72 Mass. 1303, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972). The rat~ona1e <br />behind this approach is explained in Usdin v. State of New <br />Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection, supra. There tile <br />court stated: <br /> <br />Government must have the unfettered <br />ability to protect the general welfare of <br />its citizens without Subjecting them to <br />bearing the cost. IL this was not true <br />then the greater the need for protection, <br />with consequential public cost bearing, <br />the less likely government would act to <br />defend the rights of citizens who, in <br />practicality, are unable to protect <br /> <br />e <br />