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1989] WATER RIGHTS PROTECTION 885 use through zoning ignore the realities of gravity and unreliable streamflows in arid climates.225 If an appropriator is denied the ability to deplete the stream below a certain level, or at certain times, the water that would have been diverted is forever gone, and the right is completely denied to the extent of the foregone diversion or storage. The water bypassed will not be available at the appropriator's point of diversion or storage, and additional or new water may not be physi- cally available in the future, or may be called past the appropriator by a downstream senior water right. Thus, the restriction of the exclusive right of use of waters of the stream is a complete taking of the right to the extent of the restriction. Accordingly, the analogy to zoning is not defensible, because zoning is constitutionally permissible only when it does not deprive the owner of all reasonable uses of the property.no Moreover, a "police power" restriction cannot be justified on the grounds that only a small quantity of water will be bypassed or re- leased,227 as such measures are invariably suggested when the natural flows are inadequate to meet all demands. The ability to retain water for use in times of scarcity is the essence and purpose of the appropria- tive right. The loss of even relatively small quantities of water during a drought deprives the appropriator of the water he can least afford to lose and cannot be weighed or balanced against the amount of water available at other times. If the purpose of the allocation system were only to protect users in times of plenty, Colorado would have adopted the riparian allocation system. The second principle inherent in sections 5 and 6 of article XVI, that an exclusive right to use the natural streams of the state is granted only for beneficial uses, is the constitutional recognition of the prohibi- tion against waste and the concept of the duty of water. These con- cepts are inherent in every water right and represent powerful constraints on the right of an appropriator. However, the constitution does not provide that the right to divert is only for the "most beneficial uses" or provide that certain classes of uses are superior to other classes of uses.22' Under the doctrine of prior appropriation, if a di- version and use of water are "beneficial" and not wasteful, the inquiry 225. See, e.g., Kassen, supra note 13, at 23. 226. The theoretical justification for the use of the police power to restrict one person's use of property is that the restriction is necessary to allow others to make a full and free use of their property. See City of Englewood v. Apostolic Christian Church, 146 Colo. 374, 362 P,2d 172 (1961). Zoning is not a too! to reallocate property rights to new or alternate uses. 227. See Lailos, Constitutional Limits on Police Power Regulations Affecting the Exercise of Waler Rights, 16 COLO. LAW. 1626 (1987), where the author suggests that the rationale of Keystone Bitumi. nous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987), would support a requirement that a per- c~nt;H'e nf the vielrl of 11 wllter ril>ht he 1l~Pi1 tn nrntPrt nth,.r VIl'llf"~_