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<br />7 <br /> <br />dam at Estes Park had broken. This adaptive action may be linked to <br />the extensive media coverage' of the Teton Dam collapse in Idaho, five <br />weeks before the Big Thompson flood. Earlier in the evening it had <br />been so dry in Cedar Cove that people rE,ported having watered their <br />lawns. <br />One sheriff's deputy involved in the issuancl~ of warnings ex- <br />plained how patrol cars circled two or three times in one campground <br />with loud speakers. Some people responded immediately, including a <br />coupl e who remembered the Rapi d City flood of 1972. Others responded <br />following the second and third warnings. At least two people did not <br />move from thei r camping spot and were among the vi ctims, <br />Drake, at the confl uence of the North Fork and the Bi g Thompson, <br />was hit hardest by the flood. For most people thel"e, the only warnings <br />came from en vi ronmenta 1 cues: the ri ver ri sing, the severi ty of the <br />rainfall, or a change in the sound of the river. One state patrolman was <br />was notified of the problem caused by r'ising water west of Drake. He <br />advised several people at Drake to drive down the canyon rathel" than try <br />to drive up. He had no idea what the eventual impact of the f"lood down- <br />stream would be. It is not known how many people did try to drive down <br />or what happened to them. <br />One couple he warned were returning from an evening in Estes Park, <br />They thought he was exaggerating the seriousness of the situat'ion when <br />he told them to get out of their car and climb. They died in the flood. <br />At least one couple at Wa1tonia had developed a personal contingency <br />plan in the event that the dam at Estes might one day fail. They were <br />so accustomed to the usual sound and height of the river that as soon <br />as the sound noti ceab ly changed, they responded to thi s envi ronmenta 1 <br />