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<br /> <br />Summary <br /> <br />The June 3, 1994 flood eaused damage to <br />property in loealized areas, primarily due to <br />intense flash flooding that eould not drain <br />fast enough through the storm sewer <br />network. This is an example of urban flash <br />flooding that did not result in river flooding, <br /> <br />Sinee an Emergeney Operations Center <br />(EOC) was not established and the flood was <br />not considered a major disaster, the flood <br />served as an opportunity for city, county and <br />state departments and agencies to respond <br />separately under pressure, while com- <br />munieating with each other and reealling <br />their identified responsibilities in the plan, <br />Most departments eonsidered activation of <br />the EOC to be unneeessary in this case but <br />some eommented it may have helped the <br />reeovery stage run smoother and faster. In <br />any ease, this event provided an opportunity <br />for each department and agency to praetice <br />on a smaller disaster without the aid of an <br />EOC. <br /> <br />Looking back on the incident, response and <br />recovery ran smoothly, primarily because of <br />professionalism in each individual area and <br />beeause of cooperation among agencies, It <br />has been suggested that a detailed list of <br />action items that reflect lessons learned from <br />this flood would be helpful. It would be <br />espeeially helpful if a meeting of city and <br />county responders worked cooperatively to <br />generate the list. <br /> <br />Puebw Flood Hazard Mitif!aJion Plan <br /> <br />21 <br />