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<br />than the number of letters received for and against a proposal. Water managers have <br /> <br />legitimate skepticism over water demands of groups who will bear none of the costs of their <br /> <br />desires for maximum fishery flows. By what anglers, rafters or households would pay, forces <br /> <br />instream water users too balance the benefits of added flow with the costs to themselves. <br /> <br />These "willingness to pay" estimates are similar to "shadow prices" often used in engineering <br /> <br />economics or derived from constrained optimization models. <br /> <br />Expressing the public's values in dollar terms allows a balancing of the recreational and <br /> <br />environmental benefits of instream flow with the costs. While Flug, Fontane and Ghoneim's <br /> <br />approach of creating a zero to one index to reflect the relative value of recreation as a <br /> <br />function of flow is clever, the resulting index values are not comparable to costs. <br /> <br />Communicating economic values of water in competing uses provides comparability among <br />the differing uses of water and helps to avoid the "us and them" mentality so frequent in <br />water debates. Large differences in the value of water for instream versus irrigated <br />agriculture suggests gains from trade. The public through its state government agencies can <br />offer to purchase the consumptive use portion of water from fanners so as to augment <br />instream flows. Water leasing in drought years opens up the possibility that blue ribbon trout <br />streams need not go dry to grow low value crops. Drought year waterbanks have worked <br />quite successfully in California to move over 800,000 acre feet of water from agriculture to <br />other uses in a matter of months (Loomis, 1992) with fanners gaining and "relatively low" <br />third-party effects (Howitt, 1992). <br /> <br />6 <br />