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<br />185 <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />1992). If relief could be granted to Trout Unliri1ited and Colorado Wild under any <br />theory of law. their appeal would be sufficient to survive the Dundee motion to <br />dismiss. Rosenthal v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.. 908 P.2d 1095 (Colo. 1995). <br /> <br />In most ci1'cwnstances. the Dundee motion to dismiss would be resolved solely <br />on the basis of the Appellants' allegations in the appeal. National Camera, Inc. v. <br />Sanche~ 832 P.2d 960 (Colo. App. 1991). For the purposes of resolving this motion, <br />those allegations must be accepted as true. Rosenthal, 908 P.2d at 1099. As <br />discussed earlier, the Commission also considered in resolving the motion to dismiss <br />the Division certification letter. That letter expressed the Division's factual basis and <br />legal conclusions for issuing the certification and fonus part of the background for <br />this appeal. Finally. the Commission concluded that undisputed factual <br />representations contained in the pleadings filed by the parties ate appropriate <br />lnfonnation to provide a context for its decision. While the parties are free to <br />characterize the claims in the appeal as they wish, the Commission's role at this stage <br />is not to make any detennination regarding disputed facts and the Commission makes <br />no such conclusions in issuing this order. The Commission takes action on this <br />motion to dismiss solely on the basis of the record and those facts not in dispute. <br /> <br />The parties filing an appeal do not need to precisely set forth the underlying <br />facts so long as the basis for the appeal can be clearly discerned. Shockley v. <br />Georgetown Valley Water & San. Dist., 37 Colo. App. 434, 548 P.2d 928 (1976). <br />Following review of the certification letter,the pleadings of the parties and argwnents <br />by counsel, the Commission concluded that the focus of this motion, the relief <br />requested by the Appellants, can be clearly discerned, <br /> <br />Section 25-8-104(1) prohibits interpretations and applications of the Act that <br />would impair rights to divert and apply water to beneficial uses, result in material <br />injury to water rights, or require minimum stream flows. The Commission's <br />Regulation No. 82, section 82.5(A)(S), also prohibits denial of a certification request <br />"where the imposition of conditions or denial would result in material injury to water <br />rights as prohibited under section 25-8-104, C.R.S." <br />.. <br />The Division's authority to impose conditions or deny a certification is not <br />limited to just the discharge that triggers the requirement for a 9 404 pern1it (in this <br />case, the dredge and/or fiU to construct the diversion structure) or its effects. That <br />authority extends to the construction and operation of the project once the element of <br />a discharge is established. PUD No. I of Jefferson County v, Washington <br />Department ofEcoloRY, 511 U.S. 700 (1994). Under Colorado law, though, both the <br />Division and the Commission are subject to the limits imposed by sections 25-8-104 <br />and 25-8-302(1 )(t), <br /> <br />The Colorado Supreme Court, in City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 <br />P .2d 1, 92 (Colo. 1996) observed that Colorado's water rights and water quality <br /> <br />5 <br /> <br />e <br /> <br />-'. <br />