rights, the United States being the storer and the carrier. 11 We intimate no opinion whether a different
<br />procedure might have been followed so as to appropriate and reserve to the United States all of these water
<br />rights. No such attempt was made. Though we assume arguendo that the United States did own all of the
<br />unappropriated water, the appropriations under state law were made to the individual landowners pursuant
<br />to the procedure which Congress provided in the Reclamation Act. The right so acquired are as definite and
<br />complete as if they were obtained by direct cession from the federal government. Thus even if we assume
<br />that the United States owned the unappropriated rights, they were acquired by the landowners in the precise
<br />manner contemplated by Congress.
<br />It is argued that if the right of the United States to these water rights is not recognized, its management of
<br />the federal projects will be jeopardized. It is pointed out, for example, that Wyoming and Nebraska have
<br />laws which regulate the charges which the owners of canals or reservoirs may make for the use of water.
<br />But our decision does not involve those matters. We do not suggest that where Congress has provided a
<br />system of regulation for federal projects it must give way before an inconsistent state system. We are
<br />dealing here only with an allocation, through the States, of water rights among appropriators. The rights of
<br />the United States in respect to the storage of water are recognized. So are the water rights of the [325 U.S.
<br />589, 616] landowners. To allocate those water rights to the United States would be to disregard the rights
<br />of the landowners. To allocate them to the States, who represent their citizens parens patriae in this
<br />proceeding, 12 in no wise interferes with the ownership and operation by the United States of its storage and
<br />power plants, works, and facilities. Thus the question of the ownership by the United States of
<br />unappropriated water is largely academic so far as the narrow issues of this case are concerned.
<br />V.
<br />There is some suggestion that if we undertake an apportionment of the waters of this interstate river, we
<br />embark upon an enterprise involving administrative functions beyond our province. We noted in State of
<br />Colorado v. Kansas, supra, 320 U.S. page 392, 64 S.Ct. page 180, that these controversies between States
<br />over the waters of interstate streams 'involve the interests of quasi - sovereig s, present complicated and
<br />delicate questions, and, due to the possibility of future change of conditions, necessitate expert
<br />administration rather than judicial imposition of a hard and fast rule. Such controversies may appropriately
<br />be composed by negotiation and agreement, pursuant to the compact clause of the Federal constitution. We
<br />say of this case, as the court has said of interstate differences of like nature, that such mutual
<br />accommodation and agreement should, if possible, be the medium of settlement, instead of invocation of
<br />our adjudicatory power.' But the efforts at settlement in this case have failed. A genuine controversy exists.
<br />The gravity and importance of the case are apparent. The difficulties of drafting and enforcing a decree are
<br />no justification for us to refuse to perform the important function entrusted to us by the Constitution. Those
<br />[325 U.S. 589, 6171 considerations did not prevail in State of Wyoming v. Colorado, supra, where an
<br />apportionment of the waters of an interstate stream was made. Nor did they prevail in the drainage canal
<br />cases. State of Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 , 49 S.Ct. 163; Id., 281 U.S. 179 , 50 S.Ct. 266; Id., 309
<br />U.S. 569, 60 S.Ct. 789; Id ., 311 U.S. 107 , 61 S.Ct. 154; Id., 313 U.S. 547, 61 S.Ct. 1090. And see
<br />Sanitary District v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 , 45 S.Ct. 176. We do not believe they should prevail here.
<br />We recognize the difficulties of the problem. The matter is a delicate one and extremely complex. To begin
<br />with we are confronted with the problem of equitable apportionment. The Special Master recommended a
<br />decree based on that principle. That was indeed the principle adopted by the Court in State of Wyoming v.
<br />Colorado, supra, where an apportionment of the waters of an interstate stream was made between two
<br />States, each of which had the rule of appropriation. In speaking of that rule in application to a controversy
<br />between States the Court, through Mr. justice Van Devanter, said: 'The cardinal rule of the doctrine is that
<br />priority of appropriation gives superiority of right. Each of these states applies and enforces this rule in her
<br />own territory, and it is the one to which intending appropriators naturally would turn for guidance. The
<br />principle on which it proceeds is not less applicable to interstate streams and controversies than to others.
<br />Both states pronounce the rule just and reasonable as applied to the natural conditions in that region, and to
<br />prevent any departure from it the people of both incorporated it into their Constitutions. It originated in the
<br />customs and usages of the people before either state came into existence, and the courts of both hold that
<br />their constitutional provisions are to be taken as recognizing the prior usage rather than as creating a new
<br />rule. These considerations persuade us that its application to such a controversy as is here presented cannot
<br />be other than eminently just and equitable to all concerned.' 259 U.S. page 470, 42 S.Ct. page 559. And see
<br />State of Wyoming v. Colorado, [325 U.S. 589, 618] 286 U.S. 494, 52 S.Ct. 621; State of Washington v.
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