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control. Because each calculates in the same rational but selfish manner, neither invests and both find a equilib- rium with each other that is much worse off as compared to what they could gain together by cooperative action. They are simultaneously rational in an individual sense, but are irrational in a collective sense. Obviously, throughout history people have found them- selves in such situations and for thousands of years people in virtually all cultures have surmounted the problem of individual rationality by getting organized. Now this is the stuff of sociology. If farmers A and B can devise means of holding each other accountable for making a "fair share" contribution, if they can each insure that the other will not defect from agreed upon cooperative action —in other words if they get organized in a viable way —they can work cooperatively to improve their situation. The game theory tradition to which Pro- fessors Schelling and Aumann have made their important contributions has allowed social scientists to pose two questions of great interest: 1) what are the attributes of self - sustaining social organizations that can empower individually rational actors to transcend their individual rationalities and thereby improve the conditions under which they live and work; and 2) how can individually rational players be mobilized to construct such empow- ering organizations? These two questions are central to analysis of water management problems because water capture and delivery generally involves conflict among human purposes and requires getting organized to un- dertake cooperative action that self - seeking behavior in marketplaces cannot provide. For the better part of 38 years this author has, along with colleagues in CSU sociology— working in interdisciplin- ary collaboration with engineers, economists, agrono- mists, and other natural resources disciplines including law —been studying the two big questions in the context of local organizations for managing water domestically and internationally. Our strategy has been to study local organizations in specific locales (e.g., Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Philippines, Western United States and most especially Colorado) by finding examples of failed organizational efforts and by comparing them to long en- during successful organizations in the same agro- climatic zones, same cropping patterns, same language and cul- ture patterns. The task has been to tease out crucial vari- ables that explain the differences in performance (Free- man and Lowdermilk, 1985, 1991; Freeman, Bhandarkar, Shinn, Wilkins - Wells, 1989 and Wilkins Wells, 1989) We compare our findings to the work of others who have been probing the same questions (e.g., Ostrom, 1990; Bromley, 1992). For example, CSU sociolo- gist Dr. John Wilkins -Wells has been studying the organizational needs (a variation on question 1) of a diverse array of mutual companies and irrigation districts in several western states. As this is written, the author is now studying the second question —how individually rational actors are mobilized to coop- erate to re- regulate the waters of the Platte River basin for purposes of recovering endangered and threatened species under the Endangered Species Act (Freeman, 2003 and Freeman, forthcoming) Neither Schelling nor Aumann ever did fieldwork. However, those of us in the social science com- munity who have followed the literature of game theory, and whose thinking about the meaning of our fieldwork has profited from their insights, salute them. They have provided foundations upon which much theory of social organization, conflict, and cooperation in the world of water management has been, and will continue to be, constructed. Literature Cited. Bromley, Daniel (ed.). Making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice, and Policy. (Institute of Contem- porary Studies Press, 1992). Freeman, David M., and Max K. Lowdermilk. "Middle Level Organizations As Links Between Farms and Central Irrigation Systems." in Putting People First. Sociological Variables in Rural Development. Edited by Michael Cernea (Published for the World Bank, Oxford University Press, 1986, 1991. 113 -144. Freeman, David M. (with Vrinda Bhandarkar, Edwin Shinn, John Wilkins - Wells, Pat Wilkins Wells). Lo- cal Organizations For Social Development. Con- cepts and Cases of Irrigation Organization. (West - view, 1989). Freeman, David M. "Organizing for Endangered and Threatened Species Habitat in the Platte River Ba- sin." Special Report 12. Colorado Water Resources Research Institute, Colorado State University, Fort Collins. September, 2003. This interim report is precursor to what is yet an untitled book manuscript that will examine, in detail, how individually rational water users in Colorado, Wyoming, and Nebraska came to transcend their individual rationalities and to collectively mitigate conflicts and construct a Platte River Basin Habitat Recovery Program in collabora- tion with the U.S. Department of Interior. Ostrom, Elinor. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. (Cambridge, 1990).