Natural Hazard Observer Nov 2005

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Recovery by Design: The Ongoing Challenges Presented by Katrina and Rita It has been a little more than a month since Hurricane Katrina changed the world as I know it. And then there was Hurricane Rita. I am having difficulty remembering what day or date it is. During this time period, I evacu- ated twice, changed graduate schools, searched for miss- ing friends, worked on short- and long -term disaster re- covery strategies, and refocused current work on Louisi- ana coastal issues. I have become a human rights watch- dog, a guide for researchers and caregivers, and a con- sultant for religious groups and other nongovernmental agencies, long -term disaster response planners, reporters, grant writers, counselors, nonprofit disaster responders, pastors, and friends. This disaster is personal, and each day brings new and difficult challenges. There is so much that needs to be done, so many critical human needs to be met, and yet so little time. It is commonly said that in a crisis situation time slows down or stops. But, during disaster recovery the future rushes in, forcing quick decisions to be made that do not ade- quately consider resilience and sustainability. In a disaster like this, one must think in multiple time frames of recov- ery (e.g., emergency short term and long term) simulta- neously. Being in the midst of a disaster and recovery like this, both personally and professionally, is overwhelming on a good day. As a researcher, a nonprofit disaster responder, and a local resident, the challenges were and are innumerable and varied: • Communication was extremely difficult. Information and communications systems were nonexistent, did not work, or were dysfunctional. Cell phones, which worked only intermittently, were usually the only link for communication, but no electricity meant short -lived cell phones. This made consulting and communicating with colleagues regarding urgent information and action quite complicated. • Outside groups (e.g., nongovernmental organizations, researchers, the media, and even curiosity seekers) ex- pected those of us on the ground to help them with ar- rangements, coordinate information, and interpret the state of affairs. • Unsolicited volunteers and goods flowed to the region creating ongoing logistical difficulties. • Driving time doubled, and access to some regions was denied. • Basic recovery and research tools were, and in some instances still are, hard to come by: laptops, cell phones, printers, physical space, electricity, and operat- ing funds. In some cases these items were left behind to better accommodate other evacuees. • Funding opportunities must be researched and corre- sponding proposals developed, a challenge that is espe- cially difficult to meet during dislocation and relocation in the absence of the aforementioned tools. • Recovery styles and motives vary by institution and are often at odds with best practices as well as with the wishes of the affected communities. Lack of identifica- Natural Hazards Obsewer November 2005 tion of and respect for the local knowledge of poor communities as well as that of the small colleges and universities made the emergency response problematic and likely doomed the recovery and rebuilding phase before it even began. • The political planning process is difficult to access and influence as it is monopolized by outside interests, con- tractors, and politicians. • The political input of indigenous connnunities is dnnin- ished while community members are dispersed across the country. The enormity of this disaster calls upon all resources to be used in the best and most appropriate manor. ht Ris- ing from the Ashes: Development Strategies in Times of Disaster, Mary Anderson and Peter Woodrow state that "the need for speed is a myth. Agencies believe that emergencies always require speedy response from the outside. More important than speed is timeliness. To be timely is to be there when needed. Timeliness requires that agencies look before they leap. "' We have seen many cases in this disaster where the rush of agencies and vol- unteers has hindered more than helped. At times, their needs to feel or look helpful seemed to take precedence over the needs of survivors and caregiving systems. The need to be needed seemed to drive the response. Perhaps the most frustrating and difficult part has been knowing that the incident could have been partially mitigated and better managed, and still can be: the know- how was and is available. In the November 2004 Natural Hazards Observer, Shirley Laska detailed the scenario that we are living today.2 Watching the hazard event un- fold and the disasters become reality has been heartbreak- ing knowing that the hazards research, application, and activist communities have for decades been developing a knowledge base that could have altered outcomes and can still positively influence the future, if the powers that be would only listen. For a successful recovery, some of the things that need to happen include: • Time lines need to be adjusted for long -term sustainable recovery and vulnerability reduction; • The knowledge and talent of local people and organiza- tions must be respected and used; • Guidance from local organizations and academic institu- tions needs to be respected and used; • Preexisting environmental, economic, and social issues must be addressed; and • A reading list for recovery policy makers and recovery managers need to be created and utilized. We must heed the lessons we are learning from this event as it unfolds as well as from the events that came before it. 10 To do so, we must work together as a single hazards community. In her article "Knowledge Transfer between Researchers and Practitioners," Alice Fothergill calls for acknowledging the distinct cultures of the research and s