Citizen's Guide to Colorado's Environmental Era

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1890s— Denver water officials look into building a dam at the confluence of the So Platte River and its North Fork located southwest of Denver:-== ; -T -t> Water Board opts instead for Foothills Treatment Plant. 1982 —Forty suburban governments and water districts unite and form the Metropolitan Water Providers and join Denver in the Two Forks project. 1986— Denver Water Board files for permit to build Two Forks dam. April 1987— Denver water officials unveil 15 -year, $45 million plan to ease environmental damage from the dam. June 1987 -U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service finds that dam won't harm endangered sr March 1988 —U.S. Army Corps of Engineers issues environmental stating dam potentially could cau yr- P✓a!'r e+ ^:�::� -fir ar^ May 198 '— a ro gen`cy °o icta s in envier oppose r immedi construction of dame June 1988 — Governor Roy Romer recommends that the Army Corps of Engineers approve a 25 -year permit to build dam, but says he would like to see it built elsewhere July 1988 — Colorado Water Quality Control Division issues state certification for Two Forks. January 1989 —Army Corps of Engineers announces it intends to issue a permit for the dam, including restrictions and conditions that must be met before the dam can be built. February 1989 —New EPA Administrator William Reilly halts decision - making process while he considers the proposal. March 1989 — Reilly orders EPA Regional Administrator Jim Scherer to begin process to veto Two Forks. Two days later, the EPA's Atlanta Regional Administrator Lee DeHihns announces the agency will continue the veto process, virtually dooming the project. July 1990 —In an effort to change the EPA's decision, Denver Water Board proposes cutting the planned size of Two Fork's reservoir by 59 percent. November 22, 1990 —A draft of the final decision by EPA Administrator William Reilly indicates the dam project will be vetoed. Excerpted from the Rocky Mountains News article EPA chief to veto Two Forks- commandment, too, and thereby won the biggest water victory in the interior West since the Grand Canyon. The Caucus achieved its victory by becoming a mem- ber of Governor Richard Lamm's Water Roundtable, and by pledging to work to provide the metro area with enough water to fuel growth through the first part of the 21st century. And cooperate they did, in a way the water developers may not have foreseen, by showing how metro Denver could have growth without a new dam. Two Forks had an immediate impact on those who ran the Denver metro area's water systems. Many of the existing water managers were replaced by a new breed, typified by Chips Barry. Barry was appoint- ed head of the Denver Water Department soon after the defeat of Two Forks. His attitude is illustrated by his reaction to the decision by some of the suburbs to sue the federal government to overturn the Two Forks veto: "I would just as soon not have the [Denver Water] Board appeal the Two Forks decision. It's not worth the brain damage, cost or loss of public credibility." Operationally, Barry has created a low -key, cooperative approach to Colorado's water problems that could not be more different from that of his department's preceding leaders. Barry was not alone. As the Bush Administration veto loomed, Governor Romer said that Two Forks demonstrated that the state's institutions were "out of step ... with the values of its citizens and in need of reform or overhaul." The victory appears to have had less effect on the victors. That may be because the defeat of Two Forks didn't fit in with how many environmental leaders and groups and funders viewed the world. Strategically, Two Forks showed that col- laboration and consensus seeking could pro- tect the earth even while enabling growth. Politically, the veto was delivered by a conservative Republican administration, not a liberal Democratic one Republican- driven environmentalism, growth, collaboration and consensus are all deeply suspect within western envi- ronmentalism. As a non - resident, I cannot tell why the citizens and leaders of the Denver area were ready for a substantial change in water and urban policy. Perhaps it is as simple, and distressing, as urban people thinking that water comes from faucets the way food comes from Safeway.