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In the Fort Collins decision, this Court did not authorize claims like this one for enormous <br />recreational instream appropriations. Even if it had, the Legislature enacted SB 212 after <br />Fort Collins applied for its water right, in order to negate explicitly any such authority. (v. II, <br />pp. 374, 392, 375 -382). The Appellee argues that "the State fails to disclose that after [SB <br />212] passed, the Fort Collins [sic] amended its application in 1988" and thus SB 212 was <br />applicable to the amended application. (AB, p. 16). However, the Appellee fails to disclose <br />that this Court found that "the 1988 amendments [to Fort Collins' application] relate back to the <br />1986 application," and this Court did not specifically apply retroactively 1987 legislation to a <br />1986 water right. Fort Collins, 830 P.2d at 923. Unless specifically stated, it cannot be <br />presumed that this Court was retroactively applying a 1987 law to a 1986 application. Shell v. <br />Dolores County Com'rs, 948 P.2d 1002, 1011 (Colo. 1997). <br />The Appellee would have this Court believe that recreational instream flow water rights <br />are part of "long- standing case law" and that such uses were upheld in Fort Collins, 830 P.2d at <br />932. (AB, pp. 11, 20). To the contrary, this Court did not hold in Fort Collins that the <br />"increasing demand for recreational" instream uses was being accommodated by that opinion, <br />instead of the "legislative process" as required by Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1029. In light of the <br />extreme importance and novelty of recreational instream water uses, such a holding cannot be <br />read into the Fort Collins case. This Court cannot have intended to effect a reversal of all prior <br />case law and allow recreational instream uses without any analysis of that contentious issue, and <br />0 <br />