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permission to other junior appropriators." Crystal Creek, 14 P.3d at 340, n.18. The Supreme <br />Court stated, "Courts generally disfavor selective subordi nations. However, by contract, a <br />person can make his or her priority inferior to another, and courts can give legal effect to the <br />senior user's intention to make his priority inferior in this respect." Id. at 341 (emphasis added). <br />In accordance with this principle, the Supreme Court affirmed the water court's judgment that <br />transbasin water users were not entitled to the benefits of this subordination. Id. This holding is <br />consistent with an earlier Colorado Supreme Court holding that a 1994 stipulation was <br />enforceable against the City of Englewood as a selective subordination. USI Properties East, <br />Inc. v. Sunpson, 938 P.2d 168, 177 (Colo. 1997). As a result, the Colorado Supreme Court has <br />determined several times that one water user may make his or her priority inferior to another <br />while, at the same time, denying such permission to other junior appropriators. <br />9, Colorado law also provides for temporary loans of water, even to the - CWCB,___- <br />-•--- <br />which allow junior appropriators to divert water at times when a more senior <br />water user would be prevented from doing so. See, e.g., C.R.S. § 37- 80.5 -101 et <br />seq. (creating a pilot water bank that allows loans, exchanges, interruptible supply <br />agreements using senior irrigation rights to benefit more junior water rights); <br />C.R.S. § 37 -92 -309 (allowing interruptible water supply agreements that could <br />have the effect of allowing diversions of a junior water right at times when a more <br />senior water right would be curtailed); C.R.S. § 37 -83 -105 (allowing temporary <br />loans of senior water rights to a junior irrigation water right, even an instreant <br />flow water right, which would have the effect of allowing junior water users to <br />divert while more senior rights are curtailed, or subordinated). <br />10 Even if the Court determines that the provisions of paragraphs 6.c, 6.d, and 7.b of <br />the Decree amount to a selective subordination such provisions are nevertheless <br />enforceable as written inasmuch as they are like the subordination by the United States <br />of 60,000 acre feet of future in -basin uses above the Aspinall Unit on the Gunnison River <br />a roved in the CL stal Creek case described above - Here . thr, beneficiaries of such <br />part ra hs are future in-basin junior water users above the Lower Stagecoach Gage, the <br />Oak Creek Gage, and the Morrison Creek Gage, in the total amounts of the water <br />produced in the Upper Yampa and Oak Creek drainages and the aquifer of Morrison <br />Creek and not currently appropriated future water users above the Boating Park RICD <br />and below these upper drainages cannot be inured since oily call must be reduced b the <br />flows then gaggd or in the case ofthe Morrison Creels a uifer as decreed at the <br />ownstream terminus of the upper excluded source areas which has the legal affect of <br />applying ALL of the then flows front the Excluded Sources to the shortage or cal] by the <br />Boating Park RICD This is more protection than would naturally occur without an <br />such Excluded Source provisions, since the Boating Park RICD would not be benelitin <br />by stream flow losses in such reduction between the Excluded Sources gages and the <br />Boating Park RICD Below the Boating Park there can be no injury since there is no <br />consumptive use by the Boating Park RTCI] Hence the onl ossible injury which could <br />ever be asserted by the claim of selective subordination would be future junior out -of- <br />basin diversions The Supreme Court in the Crystal Creels affirmed the validity of the <br />60,000 subordination on the Gunnison River for only in -basin users and hence the same <br />affirmation should be applicable here. <br />4 <br />0071 <br />Deleted: 9. <br />Pnrmatwd: Bullets and Numbering <br />