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967 P.2d 1042, City of Colorado Springs v. White, (Colo. 1998) Page 16 <br />problems within the Industrial Training Division and (Wilkey, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see <br />to develop strategies to improve the division," as a also Hamilton, 414 A.2d at 924 ( "The executive <br />specific deliberative process to which the Warrick privilege concept has been considered part of the <br />Report was related. common law of evidence."). <br />Secondly, while it is true that the report contains <br />the results of a survey of employees, it does not <br />follow that this material is necessarily factual in <br />nature. As explained above, the report is composed <br />almost entirely of the employees' personal opinions. <br />These contents can hardly be defined as purely <br />factual material. We therefore reject White's <br />arguments. We conclude that the trial court did <br />*1058. not abuse its discretion in finding that the <br />report was protected by the deliberative process <br />privilege. <br />V. <br />We hold that the deliberative process privilege is <br />part of the common law of this state. We also find <br />that the open records laws exempt material that <br />comes within the scope of the privilege from public <br />inspection. Because the court of appeals found that <br />the privilege does not exist in Colorado, we reverse <br />the judgment bf that court. <br />(FN1.) Section 24- 72- 204(3)(a) provides, in part: <br />Ile custodian shall deny the right of inspection of <br />I <br />he following. records, unless otherwise provided <br />by law ...: - <br />(IV) Trade secrets, privileged information, and <br />confidential commercial, financial, geological, or <br />geophysical data furnished by or obtained from any <br />person; <br />(Emphasis added.) <br />(FN2.) Because the deliberative process privilege <br />belongs uniquely to the government (and, most <br />often, to administrative agencies), this federal <br />court has emerged as the preeminent authority on <br />matters related to the privilege. <br />(FN3.) "Historically, and apart from the <br />Constitution, the privilege against public disclosure <br />or disclosure to coequal branches of the <br />Government. arises from the common sense - <br />common law principle that not all public business <br />can be transacted completely in the open." Soucie <br />v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080 (D.C.Cir.1971) <br />(FN4.) 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) provides: <br />This section [regarding mandatory disclosure] does <br />not apply to matters that are -- <br />(5) inter- agency or intra- agency memorandums or <br />letters which would not be available by law to a <br />party other than an agency in litigation with the <br />agency; <br />(FNS.) Thus, insofar as the federal executive <br />branch is concerned, the information protected by <br />the deliberative process privilege is also covered <br />by FOIA Exemption 5. It has been held, however, <br />that the deliberative process privilege "is a <br />tripartite privilege because it exists for the <br />legislative and judicial branches of government as <br />well as for the executive. " Daily Gazette Co., Inc. <br />v. West . Va.. ; Dev. Office, 198 W.Va. 563, 482 <br />S.E.2d 180,, 188 n. 16 (W.Va.1996); see also <br />Soucie,� 448 F.,2d at 1080 (Wilkey, ,c , <br />Guy v. Judicial Nominating Comrn'n, 659 A.2d <br />777, 782 (Del. Super. Ct. 1995). <br />(FN6.) In a similar situation, the Supreme Court of <br />Alaska held that, although it had never recognized <br />the deliberative process privilege by that name, its <br />prior recognition of the executive privilege was <br />precedent for the existence of the deliberative <br />process privilege in Alaska. See Capital Info. <br />Group, 923 P.2d at 33 -34. The court explained, <br />"[T]he term executive privilege' in Doe <br />encompasses what other commentators have called <br />the deliberative process privilege. We consider the <br />terms to be synonymous for purposes of - this <br />discussion." Capital Info. Group, 923 P.2d at 34 <br />(citing Doe v. Alaska Superior Court, 721 P.2d <br />617 (Alaska 1986)). <br />(FN7.) We find it significant that the common law <br />evidentiary privilege, described in Morgan, which <br />protects the "mental processes" of an. executive or <br />administrative officer has long been recognized in <br />this state. See Gilpin County Bd. of .Equalization <br />v. Russell, 941 P.2d 257, 264 (Colo.1997). As <br />discussed in Part II.A of this opinion, the mental <br />processes rule is one of the traditional foundations <br />Copyright (c) West Group 2001 No claim to original U.S. Govt. works <br />