967 P.2d 1042, City of Colorado Springs v. White, (Colo. 1998) Page 16
<br />problems within the Industrial Training Division and (Wilkey, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see
<br />to develop strategies to improve the division," as a also Hamilton, 414 A.2d at 924 ( "The executive
<br />specific deliberative process to which the Warrick privilege concept has been considered part of the
<br />Report was related. common law of evidence.").
<br />Secondly, while it is true that the report contains
<br />the results of a survey of employees, it does not
<br />follow that this material is necessarily factual in
<br />nature. As explained above, the report is composed
<br />almost entirely of the employees' personal opinions.
<br />These contents can hardly be defined as purely
<br />factual material. We therefore reject White's
<br />arguments. We conclude that the trial court did
<br />*1058. not abuse its discretion in finding that the
<br />report was protected by the deliberative process
<br />privilege.
<br />V.
<br />We hold that the deliberative process privilege is
<br />part of the common law of this state. We also find
<br />that the open records laws exempt material that
<br />comes within the scope of the privilege from public
<br />inspection. Because the court of appeals found that
<br />the privilege does not exist in Colorado, we reverse
<br />the judgment bf that court.
<br />(FN1.) Section 24- 72- 204(3)(a) provides, in part:
<br />Ile custodian shall deny the right of inspection of
<br />I
<br />he following. records, unless otherwise provided
<br />by law ...: -
<br />(IV) Trade secrets, privileged information, and
<br />confidential commercial, financial, geological, or
<br />geophysical data furnished by or obtained from any
<br />person;
<br />(Emphasis added.)
<br />(FN2.) Because the deliberative process privilege
<br />belongs uniquely to the government (and, most
<br />often, to administrative agencies), this federal
<br />court has emerged as the preeminent authority on
<br />matters related to the privilege.
<br />(FN3.) "Historically, and apart from the
<br />Constitution, the privilege against public disclosure
<br />or disclosure to coequal branches of the
<br />Government. arises from the common sense -
<br />common law principle that not all public business
<br />can be transacted completely in the open." Soucie
<br />v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080 (D.C.Cir.1971)
<br />(FN4.) 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) provides:
<br />This section [regarding mandatory disclosure] does
<br />not apply to matters that are --
<br />(5) inter- agency or intra- agency memorandums or
<br />letters which would not be available by law to a
<br />party other than an agency in litigation with the
<br />agency;
<br />(FNS.) Thus, insofar as the federal executive
<br />branch is concerned, the information protected by
<br />the deliberative process privilege is also covered
<br />by FOIA Exemption 5. It has been held, however,
<br />that the deliberative process privilege "is a
<br />tripartite privilege because it exists for the
<br />legislative and judicial branches of government as
<br />well as for the executive. " Daily Gazette Co., Inc.
<br />v. West . Va.. ; Dev. Office, 198 W.Va. 563, 482
<br />S.E.2d 180,, 188 n. 16 (W.Va.1996); see also
<br />Soucie,� 448 F.,2d at 1080 (Wilkey, ,c ,
<br />Guy v. Judicial Nominating Comrn'n, 659 A.2d
<br />777, 782 (Del. Super. Ct. 1995).
<br />(FN6.) In a similar situation, the Supreme Court of
<br />Alaska held that, although it had never recognized
<br />the deliberative process privilege by that name, its
<br />prior recognition of the executive privilege was
<br />precedent for the existence of the deliberative
<br />process privilege in Alaska. See Capital Info.
<br />Group, 923 P.2d at 33 -34. The court explained,
<br />"[T]he term executive privilege' in Doe
<br />encompasses what other commentators have called
<br />the deliberative process privilege. We consider the
<br />terms to be synonymous for purposes of - this
<br />discussion." Capital Info. Group, 923 P.2d at 34
<br />(citing Doe v. Alaska Superior Court, 721 P.2d
<br />617 (Alaska 1986)).
<br />(FN7.) We find it significant that the common law
<br />evidentiary privilege, described in Morgan, which
<br />protects the "mental processes" of an. executive or
<br />administrative officer has long been recognized in
<br />this state. See Gilpin County Bd. of .Equalization
<br />v. Russell, 941 P.2d 257, 264 (Colo.1997). As
<br />discussed in Part II.A of this opinion, the mental
<br />processes rule is one of the traditional foundations
<br />Copyright (c) West Group 2001 No claim to original U.S. Govt. works
<br />
|