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COLO. R. W. CON. DIST. v. COLO. R. W. CON. BD. Colo. 573 Cite as, Colo., 594 P.2d 570 >v 's f As to appropriation of water, the Colora- do Constitution uses the word "divert" only once; and here it was not used to mandate an essential element of an appropriation. The sole time it appears as to water is in Colo.Const. Art. XVI, § 6: "The right to divert the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied." The reason and thrust for this provision was to negate any thought that Colorado would follow the riparian doctrine in the acquisition and use of water. In 1883, early in the history of this state, this court in Thomas v. Guiraud, 6 Colo. 530, rejected the argument that Guiraud's ap- propriation was invalid because he had con- structed no ditches. Less than three years later in Larimer Co. v. Luthe, 8 Colo. 614, 9 P. 794 (1886), we find this court saying: "The maxim, Expressio unius est exclu- sio alterius, is here invoked. It is claimed that when the constitution recognizes the right to appropriate water by diversion, it excludes the appropriation thereof in any other manner. Further, that the word `divert' means to take or carry it away from the bed or channel of the stream; that therefore respondent's act of utiliz- ing a natural reservoir in the bed of the stream, and thus storing surplus water for future use, not being a diversion in the sense of the constitutional provision cited, is in conflict therewith. "We are not prepared to concede the correctness of counsel's position. It is our opinion that the above is not the most natural and reasonable view to adopt con- cerning the meaning of the constitution. The word `divert' must be interpreted in connection with the word `appropriation,' and with other language used in the re- maining sections of that instrument re- ferring to the subject of irrigation. We think there may be a constitutional ap- propriation of water without its being at the instant taken from the bed of the stream. This court has held that `the true test of the appropriation of water is the successful application thereof to the beneficial use_ designated, and the method of distributing or carrying the same, or making such application, is immaterial.' Thomas v. Guiraud, 6 Colo. 530." (Em- phasis added) Many of the early settlers in this region came from places in the east and Europe where the use of water was controlled by the owners of the land through which the stream ran. In our and area, there could be little agriculture or other development upon the non - riparian lands absent a doc- trine permitting transportation to them of water from the streams. This was a prime necessity for this new country, and the right so to develop was assured and guaran- teed by this "right to divert" provision of our constitution. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882). Idaho has a similar constitutional provi- sion. Its supreme court has held "that our constitution does not require actual physical diversion." State Dept. of Parks v. Dept. of Water Admin., 96 Idaho 440, 530 P.2d 924 (1974). The Idaho court there cited Genoa v. Westfall, 141 Colo. 533, 349 P.2d 370 (1960). Four years following the adoption of our constitution, the General Assembly enacted the "Meadow Act," which still remains on our statute books. Section 37-86 -113, C.R. 5.1973. This act permits a valid appropria- tion without a headgate or ditch of natural overflow waters with the right to construct a ditch for the taking of such water with the same priority when the stream subsides. It is apparent that members of the General Assembly, acting so shortly after the adoption of the constitution, did not agree that it est exclusio alterius. Rights ac- quired under the "Meadow Act" were up- held in Humphreys Tunnel Co. v. Frank, 46 Colo. 524, 105 P. 1093 (1909) and Broad Run Inv. Co. v. Deuel Co., 47 Colo. 573, 108 P. 755 (1910). In 1886 this court considered the question of whether storing surplus water in a natu- ral reservoir in the bed of a stream was adequate for an appropriation. Larimer Co. Reservoir Co. v. Luthe, supra It was argued that, when the constitution recog- nized the right to appropriate water by diversion, it excluded appropriation by any