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q * , I <br />January 23 -24, 2007 Board Meeting <br />Agenda Item 17 <br />Page 5 of 6 <br />with a fixed shortage assigned to Mexico, then wants to reduce the Lower <br />Basin portion of each shortage step accordingly. The Upper Basin believes at <br />the very least this is premature since the matter must be handled through the <br />State Department and the International Boundary and Water Commission. <br />The Upper Basin is unanimous in its opinion that first it is not good public <br />policy to try to pressure the State Dept. through the Interior Dept. to adopt an <br />arrangement that may not fully reflect future needs or conditions; and second, <br />there are a number of reasons why the Upper Basin should not agree to an <br />exclusive "trigger" for shortage sharing with Mexico, for example, the Upper <br />Basin may want to share some of the "savings benefits" the Lower Basin <br />would realize by shorting Mexico. Furthermore, the Upper Basin wants to <br />carefully review any such agreement and fully evaluate any possible <br />ramifications such may have on the Upper Basin. The Upper Basin is <br />concerned that there could be compact implications in any such agreement. <br />We believe that the most prudent course of action is to maintain all options at <br />this time in the event that we would like Mexico's cooperation to say <br />construct a desalination plant for the benefit of both countries. <br />d. Depending on the description of Reclamation's preferred alternative, there <br />may still be a few areas for negotiation before the state's comments on the <br />DEIS are submitted to Reclamation. <br />Conclusions: <br />• The 7 -state agreement commits the states to solve problems, much as it has <br />done over the years, through a consultation process. The consultation process <br />is much more likely to minimize ones risks than litigation. <br />• It is intended to be consistent with existing law and provides a reaffirmation <br />of the Compacts. <br />• The rights of each state and their respective positions on various legal issues <br />will be preserved. <br />• The agreement forces the Lower Basin to recognize that there is some <br />potential for shortages and that they not only need to, but will develop <br />shortage criteria. Arizona is taking shortages voluntarily, which reinforces to <br />some degree that CAP lacked a full water supply under full development <br />conditions in the basin. However, Arizona gets to "limit" the shortage that the <br />Secretary will impose to a quantity Arizona can realistically absorb, which is <br />very important to Arizona. <br />• If the States reach an agreement that they can all commit too, the Secretary of <br />Interior is far more likely to adopt that alternative in their EIS process. If the <br />Record of Decision is not in substantial conformance with the 7 -state <br />recommendations, "off ramps" are provided <br />• Nevada, in addition to its existing compact apportionment, gets an interim <br />source of water (75,000 AF annually by 2020) that they have a fairly <br />• immediate need for. This allows the fight over how to account for water <br />development on the tributaries to be delayed. Absent this agreement, Nevada <br />