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Section 13- 25- 127(1), C.R.S. (2004), provides that "the <br />burden of proof in any civil action shall be by a preponderance <br />of the evidence." Nothing in SB 216 elevates this default <br />burden of proof, and CRE 301 clearly states that the burden of <br />production does not affect the applicable burden of proof. <br />Moreover, in another water rights context, we repeatedly have <br />held that the preponderance of evidence standard applied where a <br />statutory presumption of abandonment arose and no standard was <br />specified. E.g. Haystack Ranch, LLC v. Fazzio 997 P.2d 548, <br />552 (Colo. 2000) . <br />By urging a higher standard such as clear and convincing <br />evidence or arbitrary and capricious review, the CWCB is <br />fashioning for itself the role of an administrative adjudicatory <br />agency or a quasi - judicial body - a role which, as discussed <br />above, was specifically rejected by the General Assembly. SB <br />216 does not grant the CWCB the authority to review RICD <br />applications as an administrative adjudicatory agency or quasi - <br />judicial body, and thus, its findings are not entitled to a <br />corresponding deferential standard. <br />6 It should be noted that the CWCB is not always required to hold <br />a hearing when reviewing RICD applications. § 37- 92- 102(6)(a) <br />( "Following a public hearing, if requested by any party . . . <br />. "). And, even though a hearing was held in this case, the <br />rules of evidence were not applied and cross - examination was not <br />allowed. <br />27 <br />