Laserfiche WebLink
SB 212 because of the lack of an "objective test" to determine who is speculating to obtain "a <br />valuable water right" without having to "use that water and capture it" (v. II, p. 416). <br />Allowing an entity to claim all the water for instream uses with no limits "would <br />encourage those with vast monetary resources to monopolize, for personal profit rather than <br />beneficial use, whatever unappropriated water remains." Colorado River Water Conservan cy <br />District v. Vidler Tunnel Water Co. 594 P.2d 566 (Colo. 1979). Allowing unlimited claims of <br />all the water for uses instream would allow speculation, resulting in appropriations that "deprive <br />a whole neighborhood or community of it uses, and vest an absolute monopoly in a single <br />individual." Schodde 224 U.S. at 121, 32 S.Ct. at 473; Colorado Springs v. Bender 148 Colo. <br />458, 366 P.2d 552, 555 (1961); Board of County Com'rs of County of Arapahoe, 891 P.2d 952, <br />959 (Colo. 1995) ( "Our constitution guarantees a right to appropriate, not a right to speculate. <br />The right to appropriate is for use, not merely for profit. "). <br />Although there are no written agreements subordinating this right, such as in Vail and <br />Golden the Applicant has effectively received an unlimited monopoly on an enormous amount <br />of water. Without any limits on recreational instream uses in these Whitewater Cases, the <br />Applicants can monopolize the stream for profit by claiming massive amounts of water and then <br />negotiating profitable agreements to subordinate the use. <br />C. This Court must provide a uniform definition of <br />"waste" for recreational instream uses. <br />Because there was no preexisting law on what constitutes "waste" for recreational <br />instream uses, the water courts in Division 1 ( Golden ) and Division 5 .(this case and )Lail <br />unsurprisingly issued conflicting rulings. In Division 5, the water court held in this case that any <br />19 <br />