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his taking the fraction of the whole flow to which he is entitled." Colorado Springs v. Bender 148 Colo. 458, 366 P.2d 552, 555 (1961). The economic benefits derived from leaving the water in stream for parks, recreation or scenery do not constitute a beneficial use. Empire Water & Power Co. v. Cascade Town Co. 205 F. 123 (8"' Cir. 1913). The Applicants' claims are not reasonable because they appropriate virtually the entire hydrograph by boulders in the stream. Water must not be appropriated "so as to deprive a whole neighborhood or community of it uses, and vest an absolute monopoly in a single individual." Schodde 224 U.S. at 121, 32 S.Ct. at 473; see also Bender 366 P.2d at 555. The amounts of water claimed by the applicants are unrealistically high, and undermine the policy of maximum beneficial use. The applicants are claiming essentially the entire hydrograph for Gore Creels and the Blue River, when the applicants' own evidence will show that lesser amounts fulfill the applicants' intended purposes. The applicants also are claiming water at times when the water claimed cannot be put to beneficial use to fulfill the applicants intended purpose. B. Without the requirement of "impoundment" for recreational uses, any water user could claim the entire flow of any stream for recreational purposes. Section 37 -92- 103(4), C.R.S. (2001), defines "beneficial use" to include "the impoundment of water for recreational purposes, including fishery and wildlife." (emphasis added). The inclusion of the word "impoundment" for recreational uses must mean the exclusion of recreational uses for water that is not impounded. Beeghly v. Mack 20 P.3d 610, 612 (Colo. 2001). If the Legislature had intended that water could be used for recreational purposes but not be impounded, it would not have included this limitation in the statute. The impoundment language, the "controlling in the stream" language of section 37 -92- 103(7), and the capture and possession language of section 37 -92- 305(9) show clearly that the legislature contemplated that in- channel appropriations would be limited to circumstances where the claimed water was impounded. Without these requirements any water user could claim the entire flow of any stream for recreational purposes. The Applicants would have this Court believe that there has never been an impoundment requirement to use water for recreational purposes. If the Applicants' argument were accepted, then this Court would be effectively ruling that in 1969 (when the legislature first provided for impoundment for recreation), the legislature intended that water could be appropriated for recreational purposes in the stream without diversion or impoundment. The argument that control occurs where the water runs freely instream (without impoundment) disregards the language of the statute, the intent of the legislature and the long- standing case law established by the Colorado Supreme Court. In Bd. of County Com'rs v. Crystal Creek, 14 P.3d 325, 339 -340 (Colo. 2000), the Colorado Supreme Court allowed a claim for recreational use solely because it was only one of the purposes of the reservoirs. The Court cited the case of Jicarilla