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CHAPTERI 21
<br /> The most controversial of the principles was No. 5, which was that an allowance should be made for com-
<br /> puted deficiency in firm energy generation at Hoover which might be caused by the four storage units in the
<br /> Upper Basin; i.e., Glen Canyon, Flaming Gorge, Curecanti, and Navajo, but excluding the effects of
<br /> evaporation from the surface of such reservoirs as a part of the theoretical streamflow used in the formula for
<br /> computing allowance. (The initial draft considered only the presence of Glen Canyon on the river and was
<br /> silent regarding evaporation losses.)
<br /> The allowance for computed deficiencies in Hoover firm energy is the difference between two calcula-
<br /> tions —the first in the so- called Hoover basic firm, which is the firm energy that would have been produced at
<br /> Hoover without the four storage reservoirs on the river and using an overall efficiency factor for power opera-
<br /> tions of 83 percent. The second calculation would be to adjust the energy actually generated at Hoover to an
<br /> efficiency factor of 83 percent {rather than 70 -78 percent efficiency actually experienced).
<br /> The Secrk,ry would determine how the allowance would be accomplished; i.e., (1) monetarily, if the in-
<br /> cremental cost, that is, fuel replacement cost of generating substitute energy, is less than the selling rate for
<br /> power from the Upper Basin projects, or (2) whether it might be well to compensate the Hoover Dam power
<br /> contractors with kilowatt hours through the interconnection of the two power systems.
<br /> This principle, in particular, was vigorously attacked by the Upper Basin States as without legal basis and as
<br /> implying a responsibility on the Upper Basin for energy deficiencies at Hoover which they denied. However,.
<br /> Principle No. 5 made:- provision for reimbursing the Upper Basin Fund after 1987 from Hoover Dam power
<br /> revenues for purchasing power to meet Hoover deficiencies, but not for nonfirm or other energy from the
<br /> storage project's powerplants. Interior's intention to secure reimbursement was reflected in an Additional
<br /> Regulation No. 1 to the General Regulations for Generation and Sale of Power in accordance with the
<br /> • Boulder Canyon Project Adjustment Act, adopted by Secretary Udall on July 12, 1962, 27 F.R. 6850,
<br /> which stated that the rates to be charged for electric energy after 1987 would include a component to return
<br /> } to the United States funds adequate to reimburse the Upper Basin Fund. No interest would be included in the
<br /> reimbursement. Reclamation indicated its intention to make minimum use of dollars and maximum use of
<br /> energy from Federal powerplants, but not firm energy which would otherwise be sold at firm power rates.
<br /> The principles would be applicable during the filling period, defined as the time required to fill Glen Can-
<br /> yon (elevation 3700), with a cutoff date of May 31, 1987, the date when the Hoover power contracts expire.
<br /> Provision was also made for earlier termination if conditions warranted and called for consultation with the
<br /> States before such action.
<br /> During the filling period, uses of water below Hoover Dam, other than power, will be satisfied, including
<br /> delivery of not more than 1.5 maf /yr to Mexico.
<br /> Minimum power head (elevation 3490 - 6.1 maf available surface storage) would be sought at Glen Can-
<br /> yon at the earliest practicable time without drawing Lake Mead below its rated head (elevation 1123 -
<br /> 14.5 maf available surface storage) .
<br /> The partial closure of Glen Canyon Dam was accomplished March 31, 1963, when computation of
<br /> Hoover deficiencies began, at which time Lake Mead held 22.3 maf. This dropped to 15.4 maf at the end of
<br /> January 1964. Lake Powell was about 3410 (80 feet short of the minimum power point of 3490) . With the
<br /> forecast of another poor runoff in 1964 the gates of Glen Canyon were ordered opened on March 26, 1964,
<br /> by the Secretary to maintain elevation 1123 at Lake Mead, despite Upper Basin requests that water be re-
<br /> tained in Lake Powell in order to start generation of energy by August 1, 1964.
<br /> However, 6 weeks after the gates were opened, on May 11, 1964, the Secretary announced the closure of
<br /> the gates at Glen Canyon and the modification of the 1962 Filling Criteria to reduce by 40 . feet, from eleva-
<br /> tion 1123 (rated power head) to elevation 1083 (minimum power pool), the water level below which Lake
<br /> Mead would not be drawn. This was conditioned on the fact that, in addition to the allowance for deficiencies
<br /> in firm energy pursuant to the 1962 Filling Criteria, the United States would replace impairments in Hoover
<br /> Powerplant capacity and energy which result from lowering Lake Mead below. elevation 1123 by reason of
<br /> storage of water in Lake Powell, and would also relieve the allottees of the costs of extraordinary
<br /> maintenance of the turbines and generators resulting from such lowering. These costs would be charged to
<br /> the Upper Basin Fund but were not subject to reimbursement as was the case for deficiencies in firtn energy as
<br /> determined pursuant to the 1962 Filling Criteria.
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