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To determine the Mitigatio Measu res, the task force examined: <br />a) Railroads. Considerable utility rights -of -way coincide with railroad rights -of -way. The <br />representative of Burlington Northern & Santa Fe presented in some detail the fire prevention <br />program of that line, which was believed to be representative of railroads within Colorado. This <br />program includes four season maintenance of trackside land, regular automated sensing of <br />hardware problems, altered operations on high wind days, extensive on -board fire extinguishing <br />equipment, and other activities. It appeared that railroads are actively attempting to minimize fire <br />danger. <br />b) Hydropower sources. Accounts for about 4% of Colorado's energy usage. There appears to be <br />no current danger to the closed loop facilities, such as Cabin Creek and Mt. Elbert, which produce <br />power with downhill water flow and then put the same water back uphill in low -usage hours. <br />These facilities have only evaporative water loss. Open loop facilities, which derive their water <br />from reservoir or stream flow, are projected to have adequate water for this year (2002) but may <br />be severely restricted in future years if the drought continues. Water demands for summer fire <br />fighting in 2002 could adversely affect this projection. In all cases, any hydropower lost could be <br />replaced by conventional sources without excessive strain on the system's capacity. An increase in <br />energy costs may be associated with this loss of energy supply. <br />c) Cooling water. For conventional plants, cooling water appears to be secured by adequate rights <br />and water storage for the power producers contacted. <br />d) Electric transmission lines. There appears to be sufficient redundancy to prevent the fire- <br />induced loss of a single line from leaving any part of the state "dark" for a prolonged period. Loss <br />of two or more of the major transmission lines, simultaneously, could have a more serious effect. <br />Many of the existing lines have been built with surrounding fire mitigation; however, there remain <br />lines built to standards of prior decades which hang over beds of dried wood and "feathered" <br />rights -of -way. There is some fire risk with these lines. <br />e) Gas transmission lines are typically underground and removed from direct fire risk. There is a <br />risk to gas lines from earth movement resulting from fire extinguishing efforts or from flooding as <br />a result of post fire effects including heavy rain on denuded areas. Gas line distribution and <br />pumping substations also create a risk in the event of fire, but sufficient control exists to prevent a <br />gas - fueled fire. Many rural areas are served by radial arms from substations without redundancy, <br />so the loss of a substation would eliminate supply to parties served until the substation was rebuilt <br />and restarted. There is an open question of the redundancy of high pressure gas lines serving <br />