Crystal River Supreme Court Case Decision

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Swisher, supra, where the legislative directives could be interpreted in light of objective scientific and economic standards.[FN8] FN8. Giordano, supra, concerned sanitary regulations promulgated by the Colorado Department of Health; and Swisher, supra, was interpreting the Colorado Agricultural Marketing Act of 1939 which employed such terms as "orderly marketing", "uniform grading" and "economic waste." While we agree that the standards set forth call for evaluations by biologists rather than assessments regarding public health or economics, we cannot agree that the standards are not such as could be implemented by agencies having specific expertise regarding the preservation of flora, fauna and other aspects of the natural environment. Nor do we believe that the term "natural environment," anymore than similar terms commonly coined such as "natural resources," is so vague that it does not indicate the task which the General Assembly intended the Colorado Water Board to accomplish. To require an enumeration of the forms of plant and animal life, as well as natural formations, which the legislature wished to preserve would be to impose an impossible task. The legislative objective is to preserve reasonable portions of the natural environment in Colorado. Factual determinations regarding such questions as which areas are most amenable to preservation and what life forms are presently flourishing or capable of flourishing should be delegated to an administrative agency which may avail itself of expert scientific opinion. This is particularly true, considering that the General Assembly undoubtedly anticipated that the considerations for each locale might vary. Indeed, the Districts assert this as to the environs of the three stream segments here in question. Moreover, combining the legislative directive to preserve the natural environment with the power to appropriate minimum stream flows narrows the delegation so that it involves only that part of the natural environment where survival is affected by stream flow and lakes. The Districts argue that one indication that the term "natural environment" is vague is that the Colorado Water Board is considering *479 preservation of five nonindigenous fish species which are now in the stream segments: Colorado River Whitefish and Cutthroat, Rainbow, Eastern Brook and Brown Trout. They claim that these species should not be considered "natural." The parties' stipulation of facts states that related species of fish have existed in the streams in question in recent years, but have been destroyed due to natural or man-related causes. All of the existing species are naturally reproducing in the stream systems, except some stocking is necessary for the Rainbow. We think that the Districts' interpretation of "natural" is strained. The General Assembly clearly intended to have the Colorado Water Board preserve various life forms. To consider the introduction of desirable life forms as improper substitutes for former fish species that no longer exist, would inhibit accomplishment of the legislative goal. In addition to the contention that the term "natural environment" is vague, the Districts object to the General Assembly's failure to define what it meant by the **577 phrase "to a reasonable degree." In this regard, we note a conclusion reached in Fry Roofing, supra : "In cases dealing with other areas of legitimate legislative activity where precision was determined to be impossible . . . such broad standards as 'reasonable' and 'necessary' have been found sufficient as standards, although incapable of precise definition." This describes the type of situation we are here considering. As indicated above, precision of the type which the Districts espouse would be impracticable under the circumstances. For example, the Districts urge that the General Assembly could have mandated preservation of the "existing environment" and achieve the degree of specificity required by the constitution. The present statute, however, meets