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A groundwater withdrawal fee may give some water users a further incentive to conserve water. Each state must develop an approach which meets its own needs. This is one of the major reasons why the responsibility for groundwater management lies more appropriately at the state rather than the national level. 44 The Success of Arizona's Process During the severe drought in California in 1976-1977, Governor Jerry Brown decided that California's water laws were in need of revision. He appointed a blue ribbon panel to evaluate proposals for modifying the state's water laws and to recommend needed legislation. The panel met for a year and one-half, considered the excellent papers written by a very capable staff, held public hearings and, finally, recommended new laws which were not, by any stretch of the imagination, radical. Yet the California Legislature virtually ignored the work of the Commission. The composition of Arizona's Groundwater Management Study Commission differed markedly from the California panel. The Commission consisted of 14 legislators and 11 members appointed by the governor to represent major water users and the general public. In appointing the legislative members, a balance was sought between rural and urban legislators and among those known to be sympathetic to municipal, mining and agricultural concerns. The Commission's enabling legislation dictated that the governor's appointees include two representatives for mining, two for agriculture and two for cities. Many appointees were well-recognized spokespersons for their respective interest groups with considerable clout in the legislature. Although this composition promised a contentious atmosphere, it also reflected the fundamentally political nature of the task of writing a new groundwater law. It ensured that if the Commission were successful in developing recommendations-and many skeptics were placing odds against success-the legislature would enact those recommendations into law. The Act establishing the Commission also contained a novel and arguably unconstitutional provision, It declared that, if the legislature failed to enact a new code by September 1981, the code recommended by the Commission would automatically become law. The provision was included to "hold the legislature's feet to the fire" and ensure that the work of the Commission would not go unheeded. Although the provision was challenged in 1978, the Arizona Supreme Court declined to rule on its constitutionality, saying that no injury had resulted from the challenged provision since the deadline for legislative action had not passed. Much has been made of Secretary Andrus' threat that the CAP would be jeopardized if Arizona did not enact a new groundwater code during 1980. Clearly it was a factor that motivated the negotiators to reach a timely compromise. However, by October 1979, the Commission had been meeting for almost two years. It had studied virtually every aspect of groundwater management, met at nearly 50 public meetings, made tentative recommendations on a new code and held extensive public hearings on those recommendations. In short, a great deal of time and effort had already been invested prior to Mr, Andrus' pronouncement, and a commitment to developing a comprehensive code had formed.