259 F.3d 1244, *; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17639, **;
<br />53 ERC (BNA) 1368; 31 ELR 20864
<br />state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
<br />Biodiversity Associates, an environmental group, and
<br />Donald J. Duerr, one of its members, intervened as
<br />defendants and moved to dismiss the complaint for lack
<br />of ripeness. The district court found that the Coalition
<br />had standing, at least for the purposes of a motion to
<br />dismiss, but that the claims were not ripe and the
<br />Endangered Species Act does not require federal
<br />agencies to undertake particular conservation measures.
<br />Coalition for Sustainable Resources v. United States
<br />Forest Serv., 48 F. Supp. 2d 1303 (D. Wyo. 1999). The
<br />Coalition now appeals.
<br />Page 4
<br />Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49, 18 L.
<br />Ed. 2d 681, 87 S. Ct. I507 (1967), overruled on other
<br />grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105, SI L.
<br />Ed. 2d 192, 97 S. Ct. 980 (1977). Application of the
<br />ripeness doctrine, however, "remains a confused mix of
<br />principle and pragmatic judgment reflecting its mixture
<br />of article III case and controversy requirements with
<br />prudential restraints on the exercise of jurisdiction."
<br />Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405, 1410 (10th Cir.
<br />1990). n10 Cases that challenge an [*1250] agency's
<br />failure to act, [**13] such as this one, are particularly
<br />difficult to analyze. Id.
<br />DISCUSSION
<br />To fall within our subject-matter jurisdiction, a case
<br />must raise issues that are ripe for review. Park Lake Res.
<br />v. United States Dep't of Agric., 197 F.3d 448, 450 (lOth
<br />Cir. 1999). The plaintiff bears the burden of providing
<br />evidence to establish that the issues are ripe. Id. Where,
<br />as here, a party has attacked the factual basis for subject-
<br />matter jurisdiction, we do not presume the truthfulness of
<br />the complaint's factual [**11] allegations; rather, we
<br />may consider evidence not contained in the pleadings.
<br />Pringle v. United States, 208 F.3d 1220, 1222 (IOth Cir.
<br />2000) (per curiam). We may not do so, however, if
<br />resolution of the jurisdictional question is intertwined
<br />with the merits of the case: If "resolution of the
<br />jurisdictional question requires resolution of an aspect of
<br />the substantive claim," id. at 1223, reference to evidence
<br />outside of the pleadings converts the motion to one under
<br />Rule 56. We review the district court's dismissal on
<br />ripeness grounds de novo and its findings of
<br />jurisdictional fact for clear error. Holt v. United States,
<br />46 F.3d 1000, 1003 (10th Cir. 1995); accord Cedars-
<br />Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Watkins, 11 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed.
<br />Cir. 1993) ("In the context of a ripeness determination,
<br />the district court's factual fmdings on jurisdictional issues
<br />must be accepted unless clearly erroneous." (quotation
<br />marks and brackets omitted)). Judicial review of agency
<br />action through the citizen-suit provision is governed by
<br />the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). See, e.g.,
<br />Biodiversity Legal Found v. Babbitt, 146 F.3d 1249,
<br />1252 (10th Cir. 1998); [**12] Newton County Wildlife
<br />Ass'n v. Rogers, 141 F.3d 803, 807-08 (8th Cir. 1998);
<br />Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson, 222 U.S.
<br />App. D.C. 228, 685 F.2d 678, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
<br />n10 The Coalition does not appear to argue
<br />that the citizen-suit provision of the Endangered
<br />Species Act abrogates the prudential (non-
<br />constitutional) component of the ripeness inquiry.
<br />Cf. Roe v. Ogden, 253 F.3d 1225, 1231 (10th
<br />Cir. 2001) (noting that ripeness has constitutional
<br />and prudential components). The citizen-suit
<br />provision abrogates the prudential component of
<br />the standing inquiry by allowing suits by "any
<br />person." Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164, 137
<br />L. Ed. 2d 281, 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997) (quoting 16
<br />U.S.C. § I540(g)(1)). There is no comparable
<br />language authorizing a suit at "any time," for
<br />example. We therefore examine both
<br />constitutional and prudential limits to ripeness in
<br />this case.
<br />To determine whether a case is ripe, we examine
<br />both "the fiMess of the issues for judicial decision and
<br />the hardship to the parties of withholding court
<br />consideration." Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149. [**14]
<br />In making this determination, we look to four
<br />factors: (1) whether the issues in the case are purely
<br />legal; (2) whether the agency action involved is "final
<br />agency action" within the meaning of the Administrative
<br />Procedure Act, S U.S.C. § 704; (3) whether the action
<br />has or will have a direct and immediate impact upon the
<br />plaintiff and (4) whether the resolution of the issues will
<br />promote effective enforcement and administration by the
<br />agency.
<br />The basic rationale of the ripeness requirement is "to
<br />prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature
<br />adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract
<br />disagreements over administrative policies, and also to
<br />protect the agencies from judicial interference until an
<br />administrative decision has been formalized and its
<br />effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties."
<br />HRI, Inc. v. EPA, 198 F.3d 1224, 1235-36 (10th Cir.
<br />2000). nl l None of these factors weigh strongly in favor
<br />of our exercising jurisdiction over the case at this point.
<br />To the contrary, the challenged agency "action" - the
<br />Forest Service's inaction - is not yet "final." In addition,
<br />not all the issues are parely legal, the immediate impact
<br />from the Forest Service's inaction is at best uncertain, and
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