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259 F.3d 1244, *; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17639, **; <br />53 ERC (BNA) 1368; 31 ELR 20864 <br />state a claim upon which relief could be granted. <br />Biodiversity Associates, an environmental group, and <br />Donald J. Duerr, one of its members, intervened as <br />defendants and moved to dismiss the complaint for lack <br />of ripeness. The district court found that the Coalition <br />had standing, at least for the purposes of a motion to <br />dismiss, but that the claims were not ripe and the <br />Endangered Species Act does not require federal <br />agencies to undertake particular conservation measures. <br />Coalition for Sustainable Resources v. United States <br />Forest Serv., 48 F. Supp. 2d 1303 (D. Wyo. 1999). The <br />Coalition now appeals. <br />Page 4 <br />Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49, 18 L. <br />Ed. 2d 681, 87 S. Ct. I507 (1967), overruled on other <br />grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105, SI L. <br />Ed. 2d 192, 97 S. Ct. 980 (1977). Application of the <br />ripeness doctrine, however, "remains a confused mix of <br />principle and pragmatic judgment reflecting its mixture <br />of article III case and controversy requirements with <br />prudential restraints on the exercise of jurisdiction." <br />Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405, 1410 (10th Cir. <br />1990). n10 Cases that challenge an [*1250] agency's <br />failure to act, [**13] such as this one, are particularly <br />difficult to analyze. Id. <br />DISCUSSION <br />To fall within our subject-matter jurisdiction, a case <br />must raise issues that are ripe for review. Park Lake Res. <br />v. United States Dep't of Agric., 197 F.3d 448, 450 (lOth <br />Cir. 1999). The plaintiff bears the burden of providing <br />evidence to establish that the issues are ripe. Id. Where, <br />as here, a party has attacked the factual basis for subject- <br />matter jurisdiction, we do not presume the truthfulness of <br />the complaint's factual [**11] allegations; rather, we <br />may consider evidence not contained in the pleadings. <br />Pringle v. United States, 208 F.3d 1220, 1222 (IOth Cir. <br />2000) (per curiam). We may not do so, however, if <br />resolution of the jurisdictional question is intertwined <br />with the merits of the case: If "resolution of the <br />jurisdictional question requires resolution of an aspect of <br />the substantive claim," id. at 1223, reference to evidence <br />outside of the pleadings converts the motion to one under <br />Rule 56. We review the district court's dismissal on <br />ripeness grounds de novo and its findings of <br />jurisdictional fact for clear error. Holt v. United States, <br />46 F.3d 1000, 1003 (10th Cir. 1995); accord Cedars- <br />Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Watkins, 11 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. <br />Cir. 1993) ("In the context of a ripeness determination, <br />the district court's factual fmdings on jurisdictional issues <br />must be accepted unless clearly erroneous." (quotation <br />marks and brackets omitted)). Judicial review of agency <br />action through the citizen-suit provision is governed by <br />the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). See, e.g., <br />Biodiversity Legal Found v. Babbitt, 146 F.3d 1249, <br />1252 (10th Cir. 1998); [**12] Newton County Wildlife <br />Ass'n v. Rogers, 141 F.3d 803, 807-08 (8th Cir. 1998); <br />Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson, 222 U.S. <br />App. D.C. 228, 685 F.2d 678, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1982). <br />n10 The Coalition does not appear to argue <br />that the citizen-suit provision of the Endangered <br />Species Act abrogates the prudential (non- <br />constitutional) component of the ripeness inquiry. <br />Cf. Roe v. Ogden, 253 F.3d 1225, 1231 (10th <br />Cir. 2001) (noting that ripeness has constitutional <br />and prudential components). The citizen-suit <br />provision abrogates the prudential component of <br />the standing inquiry by allowing suits by "any <br />person." Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164, 137 <br />L. Ed. 2d 281, 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997) (quoting 16 <br />U.S.C. § I540(g)(1)). There is no comparable <br />language authorizing a suit at "any time," for <br />example. We therefore examine both <br />constitutional and prudential limits to ripeness in <br />this case. <br />To determine whether a case is ripe, we examine <br />both "the fiMess of the issues for judicial decision and <br />the hardship to the parties of withholding court <br />consideration." Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149. [**14] <br />In making this determination, we look to four <br />factors: (1) whether the issues in the case are purely <br />legal; (2) whether the agency action involved is "final <br />agency action" within the meaning of the Administrative <br />Procedure Act, S U.S.C. § 704; (3) whether the action <br />has or will have a direct and immediate impact upon the <br />plaintiff and (4) whether the resolution of the issues will <br />promote effective enforcement and administration by the <br />agency. <br />The basic rationale of the ripeness requirement is "to <br />prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature <br />adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract <br />disagreements over administrative policies, and also to <br />protect the agencies from judicial interference until an <br />administrative decision has been formalized and its <br />effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties." <br />HRI, Inc. v. EPA, 198 F.3d 1224, 1235-36 (10th Cir. <br />2000). nl l None of these factors weigh strongly in favor <br />of our exercising jurisdiction over the case at this point. <br />To the contrary, the challenged agency "action" - the <br />Forest Service's inaction - is not yet "final." In addition, <br />not all the issues are parely legal, the immediate impact <br />from the Forest Service's inaction is at best uncertain, and