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Y ~ <br />Page 12 <br />48 F. Supp. 2d 1303, *; 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7198, **; <br />48 ERC (BNA) 1753 <br />dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court <br />can look beyond the pleadings if the defendant is not <br />asserting a facial attack. See Holt v. United States, 46 <br />F.3d 1000, 1002-03 (IOth Cir. 1995). However, as will <br />be more fully discussed below, the Court's review of the <br />law on standing reveals that the defendants may not <br />submit additional materials to defeat standing at the <br />motion to dismiss stage, despite the fact that standing is a <br />jurisdictional question. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of <br />Wildlife, 504 U.S. SSS, 561, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351, 112 S. <br />Ct. 2130 (1992). <br />First, the plaintiffmust have suffered an injury in fact--an <br />invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) <br />concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, <br />not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a <br />causal connection between the injury and the conduct <br />complained of--the injury has to be fairly ... traceable to <br />the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... the <br />result [of] the independent action of some third party not <br />before the court. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to <br />merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a <br />favorable decision. <br />H. 5tanding n3 <br />n3 For reasons that will be explained later in <br />this order, the standing and ripeness analyses will <br />only deal with Plaintiffs ESA claims because <br />Plaintiffs NRRRPA claim must be dismissed <br />because the United States has not waived its <br />sovereign immunity. Any NRRRPA claim must <br />be brought through the APA, where a waiver of <br />sovereign immunity can be found. <br />**16 <br />Defendants have attacked the standing of Plaintiff to <br />bring this lawsuit. Standing is grounded in Article III of <br />the U.S. Constitution, which restricts federal court <br />adjudication to actual cases or controversies. See Allen v. <br />Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750, 82 L. Ed. 2d 556, 104 S. Ct. <br />3315 (1984). [*1310] "Standing is but one of several <br />gatekeepers founded in concern about the proper--and <br />properly limited--role of the courts in a democratic <br />society." Utah v. Babbitt, 137 F.3d 1193, 1201 (IOth Cir. <br />1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). <br />Because Plaintiff has invoked Article III jurisdiction <br />to challenge the conduct of the executive branch of the <br />federal government, the necessity of a case or <br />controversy is of extreme importance. See id at 1202. <br />"The warnings against unrestrained exercise of the power <br />of judicial review over the conduct of the executive or <br />congressional branches by relaxing the standing <br />requirements are numerous and dire." Id. (citing <br />numerous authorities). Accordingly, "these principles <br />mandate strict compliance with the standing <br />requirements." Id. (citing Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, <br />117 S. Ct. 2312, 2317, 138 L. Ed. 2d 849 (1997)). <br />The following [**17] elements must be established <br />by the plaintiffto demonstrate standing: <br />Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61. <br />The standing requirements are not mere pleading <br />requirements, but instead are an indispensable part of the <br />plaintiffs case; "each element must be supported in the <br />same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears <br />the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of <br />evidence required at the successive stages of litigation." <br />Id. at 561. At the motion to dismiss stage, general factual <br />allegations of injury resulting from the defendants' <br />conduct will suffice because [**18] upon a motion to <br />dismiss, the Court presumes that the general allegations <br />embrace the more specific allegations. See id. Upon a <br />motion for summary judgment, however, the plaintiff can <br />no longer rest upon mere allegations and must put forth <br />specific facts by affidavit or other evidence. See id. And <br />at the final stage, those facts must be supported by the <br />evidence. See id. <br />This brings up a preliminary matter that must be <br />addressed. Defendants have submitted an entire volume <br />of additional evidence in support of their motion to <br />dismiss. Although not mentioned in their brief, <br />Defendants apparently assumed that since their motion <br />was, in part, one to dismiss for lack of standing (which is <br />jurisdictional in nature) additional materials could be <br />submitted without converting the motion to one for <br />summary judgment. Plaintiff has opposed this attempt, <br />citing the principles announced above. The Court has <br />since conducted an exhaustive review of the law in this <br />area. As it turns out, although standing is jurisdictional in <br />nature, courts have treated standing "different" than other <br />jurisdictional issues on a motion to dismiss. Lujan <br />specifically avers that standing is to be analyzed [**19] <br />at successive stages under differing burdens on the <br />plaintiff. This notion goes against the idea of allowing the <br />defendants to submit outside evidence at the motion to <br />dismiss stage to defeat standing. Furthermore, the Court <br />did not uncover one case where the defendant was <br />allowed to submit additional evidence to defeat standing <br />at the motion to dismiss stage; indeed, to do so flies in <br />the face of Lujan's explanation of differing burdens at <br />successive stages in the litigation.