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<br />48 F. Supp. 2d 1303, *; 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7198, **;
<br />48 ERC (BNA) 1753
<br />dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court
<br />can look beyond the pleadings if the defendant is not
<br />asserting a facial attack. See Holt v. United States, 46
<br />F.3d 1000, 1002-03 (IOth Cir. 1995). However, as will
<br />be more fully discussed below, the Court's review of the
<br />law on standing reveals that the defendants may not
<br />submit additional materials to defeat standing at the
<br />motion to dismiss stage, despite the fact that standing is a
<br />jurisdictional question. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of
<br />Wildlife, 504 U.S. SSS, 561, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351, 112 S.
<br />Ct. 2130 (1992).
<br />First, the plaintiffmust have suffered an injury in fact--an
<br />invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a)
<br />concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent,
<br />not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a
<br />causal connection between the injury and the conduct
<br />complained of--the injury has to be fairly ... traceable to
<br />the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... the
<br />result [of] the independent action of some third party not
<br />before the court. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to
<br />merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a
<br />favorable decision.
<br />H. 5tanding n3
<br />n3 For reasons that will be explained later in
<br />this order, the standing and ripeness analyses will
<br />only deal with Plaintiffs ESA claims because
<br />Plaintiffs NRRRPA claim must be dismissed
<br />because the United States has not waived its
<br />sovereign immunity. Any NRRRPA claim must
<br />be brought through the APA, where a waiver of
<br />sovereign immunity can be found.
<br />**16
<br />Defendants have attacked the standing of Plaintiff to
<br />bring this lawsuit. Standing is grounded in Article III of
<br />the U.S. Constitution, which restricts federal court
<br />adjudication to actual cases or controversies. See Allen v.
<br />Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750, 82 L. Ed. 2d 556, 104 S. Ct.
<br />3315 (1984). [*1310] "Standing is but one of several
<br />gatekeepers founded in concern about the proper--and
<br />properly limited--role of the courts in a democratic
<br />society." Utah v. Babbitt, 137 F.3d 1193, 1201 (IOth Cir.
<br />1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
<br />Because Plaintiff has invoked Article III jurisdiction
<br />to challenge the conduct of the executive branch of the
<br />federal government, the necessity of a case or
<br />controversy is of extreme importance. See id at 1202.
<br />"The warnings against unrestrained exercise of the power
<br />of judicial review over the conduct of the executive or
<br />congressional branches by relaxing the standing
<br />requirements are numerous and dire." Id. (citing
<br />numerous authorities). Accordingly, "these principles
<br />mandate strict compliance with the standing
<br />requirements." Id. (citing Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811,
<br />117 S. Ct. 2312, 2317, 138 L. Ed. 2d 849 (1997)).
<br />The following [**17] elements must be established
<br />by the plaintiffto demonstrate standing:
<br />Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61.
<br />The standing requirements are not mere pleading
<br />requirements, but instead are an indispensable part of the
<br />plaintiffs case; "each element must be supported in the
<br />same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears
<br />the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of
<br />evidence required at the successive stages of litigation."
<br />Id. at 561. At the motion to dismiss stage, general factual
<br />allegations of injury resulting from the defendants'
<br />conduct will suffice because [**18] upon a motion to
<br />dismiss, the Court presumes that the general allegations
<br />embrace the more specific allegations. See id. Upon a
<br />motion for summary judgment, however, the plaintiff can
<br />no longer rest upon mere allegations and must put forth
<br />specific facts by affidavit or other evidence. See id. And
<br />at the final stage, those facts must be supported by the
<br />evidence. See id.
<br />This brings up a preliminary matter that must be
<br />addressed. Defendants have submitted an entire volume
<br />of additional evidence in support of their motion to
<br />dismiss. Although not mentioned in their brief,
<br />Defendants apparently assumed that since their motion
<br />was, in part, one to dismiss for lack of standing (which is
<br />jurisdictional in nature) additional materials could be
<br />submitted without converting the motion to one for
<br />summary judgment. Plaintiff has opposed this attempt,
<br />citing the principles announced above. The Court has
<br />since conducted an exhaustive review of the law in this
<br />area. As it turns out, although standing is jurisdictional in
<br />nature, courts have treated standing "different" than other
<br />jurisdictional issues on a motion to dismiss. Lujan
<br />specifically avers that standing is to be analyzed [**19]
<br />at successive stages under differing burdens on the
<br />plaintiff. This notion goes against the idea of allowing the
<br />defendants to submit outside evidence at the motion to
<br />dismiss stage to defeat standing. Furthermore, the Court
<br />did not uncover one case where the defendant was
<br />allowed to submit additional evidence to defeat standing
<br />at the motion to dismiss stage; indeed, to do so flies in
<br />the face of Lujan's explanation of differing burdens at
<br />successive stages in the litigation.
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