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Court must also note that counsel for CWCB have conceded that at even twice the <br />CWCB recommended quantity, the 102(6) criteria would be satisfied. <br />3. The next critical issue for analysis of this application is the conflicting <br />arguments with respect to the weight the Court should give to the phrase "minimum" <br />stream flow for a reasonable recreational experience as utilized in the statute. <br />Based on the evidence presented at trial, other water courses range from 50 cfs <br />to 2,000 cfs. Specifically, the Olympic course designed by CWCB's expert, Ocoee in <br />Tennessee, has a flow rate between 1,200 and 1,600 cfs. This is an "artificial course" <br />below the Tennessee Valley Authority Dam. He has also designed courses with a <br />minimum stream flow as low as 50 cfs. <br />CWCB places great emphasis on the statement by the Court's designer, Lacy, <br />that expert kayakers will be attracted at 250 cfs water. The Court has discussed this <br />previously earlier in this Order. In discussing the Court's function in interpreting <br />legislative intent, the Court must first look at the statute. See generally Peopfe v. Smith, <br />77 P.3d 751, 755 (Colo.App. 2003): <br />Courts must cons#rue each provision of comprehensive statutory scheme <br />to effectuate the overa4l legislative intent. People v. Garcia, 64 P.3d 857, <br />2002 WL 58926 (Colo.App. 99CA2360), Jan. 17. 2002). To determine <br />intent, courts give statutory terms their commonly accepted meaning. <br />Where the statutory fanguage is unambiguous and the legislative intent <br />reasonably clear, courts do no apply other rules of statutory construction. <br />People v. Trianfos, 55 P.3d 131, 134 (Colo. 2002). In addition, courts <br />should not presume the General Assembly used language idly. People v. <br />J.J. H., 17 P.3d 159 (Colo. 2001). <br />In Empire Lodpe Homeowners Association v. Mover, 39 P.3d 1139 (Colo. <br />2001), the Court stated at p. 1152: <br />16