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J. Wildl.:~tanage. 63(3):1999 $TdTISTICAL $ICNiFIC.4NCE TESTING • )vJutson 169 <br />WHAT ARE THE ALTERNATIVES? <br />What should we do instead of testing hypoth- <br />eses? As Quinn and Dunham (1983) pointed <br />out; it is more fruitful to determine the relative <br />importance to the contributions of, and inter- <br />actions between, a number of processes. For <br />this purpose, estimation is far more appropriate <br />than hypothesis testing (Campbell 1992). For <br />certain other situations, decision theory is an <br />appropriate tool.. For either of these applica- <br />tions, as well as for hypothesis testing itself, the <br />Bayesian approach offers some distinct advan- <br />tages over the traditional methods. These alter- <br />natives are briefly outlined below. Although the <br />alternatives will not meet all potential needs, <br />they do offer attractive choices in many fre- <br />quently encountered situations. <br />Estimates and Confidence Intervals <br />Four decades ago, ?,nscombe (1956) ob- <br />served that statistical hypothesis tests were to- <br />tally irrelevant. and that what was needed were <br />estimates of magnitudes of effects, with stan- <br />dard errors. Yates ;196.1) indicated that "The <br />most commonly occurring weakness in the. ap- <br />plication of Fisherian methods is undue em- <br />phasis on tests of significance. and failure to <br />reco~rtize that itt many hies of experimental <br />work estimates of the treahnent effects, togeth- <br />er ~~Zth estimates of the errors to ~.vhich then are <br />subject, are the quantities of pntnan• interest." <br />Further. he(:ause ~.il(ilile ecolo~~ists want to in- <br />fluence management practices. Johnson (19951 <br />noted that. "If ecologists are to he taken seri- <br />o!_rsl~• b~- decision makers. they unist provide in- <br />formation useful li)r decidincg on a course of ac- <br />tion, as opposed to addressirng pccrc-l~~ academic <br />c{nestions.•' To enlince that point. severil echi- <br />cation and psvcholo~~ical jountals hove adopted <br />editorial policies requiriu~ that parameter esti- <br />mates accontpanv any P-values he presented <br />!~(cLean and 1;ntest 1~)~)tii, <br />Ordiuarv cunfidenc•e intervals pro~~de more <br />inli)rmation than clo P-values. Knowing that a <br />95°!n confidence inten~al includes zero tells one <br />that, if a test of the lhypothesis that the param- <br />eter equals zero is antchtcted, the resulting P- <br />value ~~ill be >0.0.5. A confidence interval pro- <br />vides both an estimate of the effect size and a <br />me.tsure of its uncertainh~. A 9S°7o confidence <br />interval of. sa., (-50.:300) suggests the param- <br />eter is less well estimated than would a confi- <br />dence inten-al of (L0. 1:30). Perhaps surpris- <br />ingly, confidence intervals have a longer history <br />than statistical hypothesis tests (Schmidt and <br />Hunter 1997). <br />With its advantages and longer history, ~vhy <br />have confidence intervals not been used more <br />than they have? Steiger and Fouladi •(1997) and <br />Reichardt and Gollob (1997) posited several ex- <br />planations: (1) hypothesis testing has become a <br />tradition; (2) the advantages of confidence in- <br />tervals aze not recognized; (3) there is some ig- <br />norance of the procedures available; (4) major. <br />statistical packages do not include many confi- <br />dence interval estimates; (5) sizes of parameter <br />estimates are often disappointingly small, even <br />though they may be very significantly different <br />from zero; (6) the wide confidence intervals that <br />often result from a study are embarrassing; (7) <br />some hypothesis tests (e.g., chi-squaze contin- <br />gency=table) have no uniquelc defined param- <br />eter associated with them: and (8i recommen- <br />dations to use confidence intervals often are ac- <br />companied b~~ recommendations to abandon <br />.statistical tests altogether. which is umvelcome <br />advice. These reasons are not valid excuses for <br />avoiding confidence inten•ais in lieu of h~poth- <br />esis tests in situations for ~~•hich parameter es- <br />tintation is the objective. <br />Decision Theory <br />Otten exTeriments or surveys are conducted to <br />help ntal:e some decision, suc!t BLS ~vlhat limits to <br />set on huntin<_ se.LSOUS. If a forest stare! shoctkl he <br />lc>~,ecl. or i} :t pesticicle slu)uld be appro~~ecl. In <br />those r.LSes. ll~rotltesis testing is inadequate. for <br />it does not hue utto consideration tte costs o <br />~dtentative actions. Here a nsefitl trxtl is statistical <br />decision tteon~: the theon~ of actin, rttionallv <br />.~itc respect to anticipated ~,ains and losses. in the <br />lacy of nncertainh. Ehpottesis testincg ,euerallv <br />liu!its the prohabilih~ of a T.pe I error (rejecting <br />a tnte null h~jtottesis i, oltett arhitrarily set ut a . <br />= 0.0.5. while letting tte prohahilih~ of a Tire II <br />error tacce_ptincg a false n!ill It~pothesis~ fall where <br />it may. In ecologicil situations. however. a Type <br />II error tnav be far more costs than a Type I <br />error (Tott and Shea 1983)..•~s art example, ap- <br />pro~in~g a pesticide that reduces the survih~il rate <br />of an endan_ered species b~' S9o may be disas- <br />trous tci that species, even if that change is not <br />statistically detectable. As another, continued <br />overharvest in marine fisheries may resrilt in the <br />collapse of tte ecosystem even while statistical <br />tests are unahle to reject the mill hypothesis that <br />fishing has no effect (Dayton 1998). Details on <br />