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Moneys from the tax penalty would help fund the various incentive programs <br />described above. <br />Stipulation: The tax penalty would apply to land use conversions or economic <br />activities resulting in the elimination or substantial degradation of endangered, <br />threatened, and candidate species and significant biodiversity habitat. Such a <br />penalty could be progressively structured so that the most sensitive and biologi- <br />cally valuable habitat would carry the most severe tax. <br />Rationale: The concept for a tax penalty is founded in the mature body of work <br />on pollution fees and taxes (Pearce 1990, Baumol and Oates 1988) designed to <br />reflect the external, social costs of economic activity. Pollution fees, for example, <br />are an increasingly common pollution control device in Europe (Shaw 1991). Just <br />as pollution fees penalize polluters of clean air, water, and soil, penalty taxes <br />would penalize land abusers of `clean,' habitat. <br />Transaction Costs: A progressive tax penalty for habitat conversion would <br />require the development of a variable rate tax structure reflecting the biological <br />value of the various habitats. Lands to be converted would have to be assessed <br />for their habitat type and quality, and acreage delineations would have to be <br />conducted. This could entail National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) type <br />reporting requirements for all levels of land use changes (as are already required <br />by California's Environmental Quality Act). A monitoring and penalty system <br />would also have to be established to ensure compliance. <br />Research Questions and Issues: The primary research need is fora comprehen- <br />sive biological survey on private lands. Existing information on endangered and <br />threatened species population locations on private lands is imprecise and incom- <br />plete. The knowledge curve drops sharply for locational information of candidate <br />species and habitat supporting significant biodiversity. The annual conversion rate <br />of habitat-supporting private Iands is unknown. Research on establishing appro- <br />priate taxation levels is also needed. <br />Eliminating Perverse Incentives. Perverse incentives are those financial and <br />regulatory inducements that lead to a loss and degradation of habitat for endan- <br />gered species and significant biodiversity. Examples include the pre-1985 USDA <br />subsidy to farmers for drainage and conversion of wetlands to agricultural land, <br />subsidized federal timber sales, price supports to sugar farmers that result in <br />habitat loss and pollution in Florida, and below-cost grazing fees that encourage <br />the use of federal lands that may be better suited for other uses. Losos (In Prepa- <br />ration) documents that perverse incentives often result in habitat loss that then <br />requires the expensive protection of the ESA. <br />11 <br />