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7/14/2009 5:02:31 PM
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5/22/2009 6:55:04 PM
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UCREFRP
UCREFRP Catalog Number
7887
Author
Fischer, H., (Wendy E. Hudson, ed.).
Title
Building Economic Incentives Into The Endangered Species Act, Third Edition.
USFW Year
1994.
USFW - Doc Type
Washington, D.C.
Copyright Material
NO
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viability of our various economic endeavors. As a result, many types of develop- <br />ment or extraction activities are undertaken that appear to make financial and <br />economic sense, but that seriously harm the habitats supporting endangered <br />species and overall biodiversity. Incorporating these social values into the calcu- <br />lus of project profitability, through terms of price, would mean having enough <br />social and financial information with which to make fully informed decisions. A <br />complete consideration of these broader values would probably render many such <br />activities unprofitable. This is the lesson western ecological economists are <br />teaching in the developing world; the short-term economic gain derived from <br />clearing another 20 hectares of rainforest, or from converting another 5 hectares <br />of elephant habitat to cash crops, may not make long-term economic or social <br />sense (Swanson and Barbier 1992). Such a lesson is equally applicable in the <br />economic arenas of our own backyards. <br />The use of economic incentives to motivate private parties to conserve important <br />habitat on private lands becomes especially compelling when land ownership <br />patterns and the distribution of endangered species in the United States are con- <br />sidered. Nearly 80 percent of U.S. lands (excluding Alaska) are privately owned <br />or held bynon-federal government entities. Roughly 95 percent of these lands are <br />classified as rural and non-developed, some portion of which support habitat for <br />biological resources at risk (Soil Conservation Service 1987). Of the 728 cur- <br />rently listed federal endangered and threatened species, approximately 50 percent <br />are found only on private lands. Another 20 percent of these species have at least <br />half their known occurrences on private lands (Natural Heritage Data Center <br />1993). The distribution of the roughly 3,700 federal candidate species is not <br />known, but may be assumed to follow roughly similar distribution patterns. <br />The problem is compounded further by the way private land is evaluated in the <br />United States. Neoclassical economics texts continue to teach that the value of <br />land is nothing more than the revenue potential of its production capacity. The <br />benchmark for land tax assessments is the "highest and best use" to which land <br />can be put, which means determining the maximum likely revenue potential for <br />each parcel of earth. The presence of endangered species habitat on private land <br />is a liability that is scored in the debit column. Our task is to convert the tremen- <br />dous value our society holds for endangered species and biodiversity into positive <br />financial terms, so that these valuable biological resources will begin to be scored <br />in the asset column (Repetto 1989). <br />Our goal is to develop a system of economic incentives and disincentives that will <br />affect the countless marginal decisions and considerations that constitute our <br />private economy. Will farmer Jones convert another 20 acres of open meadow to <br />row crops? Will developer Smith add another 100 units of housing to her project <br />in southern Arizona? In the absence of prices that convey the full social, ecologi- <br />cal, and biological costs of these decisions, these landowners will choose alterna- <br />tives that maximize their short-term financial returns at the expense of the long- <br />term, inter-generational interests of our society. On the other hand, positive <br />2 <br />
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