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while development-oriented landowners have the resources to use existing provi- sions of the ESA, such as the Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP) process, the typical rural landowner -who is not interested in developing his or her land - finds the HCP process too expensive and too cumbersome. Graham says rural landowners want to participate actively in land use decisions; have a reasonable and predictable appeal process; and have clear, achievable requirements where true costs are reimbursed. Both Graham and McKinney suggest that state agencies should be playing a larger role in working with private landowners on endangered species recovery, as they have staff who routinely work in the local communities. They argue persua- sively that this specific knowledge of local needs and attitudes assists in problem- solving. Similarly, the three papers from U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) employees Ralph Morgenweck (Chapter 9), Jeffrey Opdycke (Chapter 10), and Jim Bartel (Chapter 11) provide important insight into problems from the point of view of the endangered species manager. All express frustration at only being able to initiate recovery programs at a point when species are already depleted and the opportunities for less costly and less intrusive management have passed. The FWS writers also make a strong case for a more streamlined process of environmental review and decisionmaking on endangered species issues involving private lands. They suggest a need for interim decisionmaking on larger projects so landowners have a clearer, more predictable process. They also suggest that review documents be better calibrated to fit the scale of the project. They note that smaller landowners are sometimes reluctant to get involved in HCPs because of the complexity and expense of the process. Finally, several papers provide both a philosophical and economic framework for understanding what makes incentives work. John Baden and Tim O'Brien (Chap- ter 12), Randal O'Toole (Chapter 13), and Terry Anderson and Jody Olsen (Chap- ter 14) suggest why our economic and political systems sometimes work at cross purposes. They argue with passion that incentives will provide more success and more cooperation than prescriptive legislation, particularly on private land. While the increasing din over endangered species management on private lands is new, in some ways it parallels a similar dilemma with the Endangered Species Act that arose more than a decade ago. In the early 1980s, reintroduction of several controversial endangered species was being stymied by interests that perceived the ESA as simply too restrictive. These interests argued that they did not oppose recovery, but rather, ESA restrictions that recovery would bring. Nevertheless, they proposed changes in the law that would have obstructed reintroductions. ix