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knowledge about the behavior and habitat requirements of the species to be protec ted. For abundant species, the needed information is either known or can be co llec ted through experiments with management techniques. Often, how- ever, very little is known about the habits of endangered or rare species, and predicting the response of such species to management techniques is very prob- lematical. That is, wildlife management may be more appropriate as a supple- ment to control of development than as a replacement for it. A third reason has to do with the incentives facing an agency with the responsibility of protecting endangered species. The costs of wildlife management come out of the agency's budget, whereas the costs of regulation are paid by the regulatee. With many species to protect and limited resources to do so, an agency has an incentive to export the costs when possible. Therefore, even if substitution of wildlife management is otherwise attractive, it could be thwarted by insti- tutional barriers. 3. Distributional Consequences. Protection of endangered species pro- vides benefits to society, but it also imposes costs in opportunities foregone. How are these costs to be distributed? More specifically, given an economic development that must be circumscribed or canceled to avoid impacts on endan- gered species or critical habitat, should the costs of doing so be borne by the developer? From the standpoint of fairness, this is not an altogether easy question to answer. Ownership of land or other resources confers rights which, while not abso lute, are none the less substantial. According to the Constitution, if the government is to prevent those rights from being exercised, the owner must be compensated. In the context of endangered spec ies protec tion, what sorts of landowner activities may be regulated, and what sorts require compensation? Most people would agree, for example, that the killing of endangered species on private land could be regulated without unduly diminishing the value of the property right. But what of "reasonable" use of land, ordinary economic acti- vities that inadvertently affect the habitat of endangered species? Regulation of this sort of activity would, moreover, seem to violate at least one of the canons of equity used in public finance: willingness~to-pay. Application of the willingness-to-pay concept would suggest that the cost of endangered spe- cies protec tion should be borne by the public at large or perhaps by preser- vationists with an especially strong interest in endangered species protection. 8