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,.............................. .................................... .............................. ..................... ..................... ............................... F RAY E 0 o does not apply to potentially suitable unoccupied habitat. As a consequence, landowners with such habitat may be so afraid of restrictions that a "take" prohibition would impose that they do not improve habitat. In fact, they have an incentive to destroy it in order to keep endangered species away (National Association of Home Builders 1996). Second, endangered species habitat often requires active management, such as periodic burning or removal of exotic species, to remain suitable. Because the ESA does not explicitly require landowners to maintain habitat, the habi- tat can undergo steady degradation over time. The first three safe-harbor agreements - for the Attwater's prairie chicken (IJmpanuchus cupido attwateri) in Texas, for the restoration of the aplomado falcon (Falco femora/is) in Texas and for the red-cockaded woodpecker (Picoides borealis) in the Sandhills region of North Carolina - have received considerable attention. They are the models for the Clinton administra- tion's draft policy on safe harbor, announced in June, 1997. Through this policy, the administra- tion seeks to involve more private landowners in safe-harbor agreements, covering more species and habitat types. Concerns About Safe-Harbor Agreements Conservation advocates have voiced several concerns about safe-harbor agreements. First and perhaps most important is concern about how the landowner's baseline responsibility is deter- mined. This can be complicated and may involve land surveys, population estimates and quantifi- cation of occupied habitat. There is some uncer- tainty associated with all of these factors, and to SAFETY NETS the extent that the baseline is negotiable, there is a risk that it will be influenced more by the landowner's desire for an economic return on the property than by the biological needs of the species. Second, landowners may be tempted to degrade habitat deliberately prior to entering into a safe-harbor agreement in order to lower the baseline. Third, safe-harbor may not always be appro- priate. For example, depending on the species and habitat type, some animals may move from protected habitat to nearby habitat that has been enhanced under a safe-harbor agreement. Because the protected habitat could be destroyed after the animals abandon it and the enhanced habitat also could be destroyed, the species could be worse off than without an agreement. Nevertheless, many scientists believe that the benefits of maintaining and expanding habitat through safe-harbor agreements outweigh this concern. They contend, however, that sound monitoring programs must accompany the agree- ments. The Clinton administration's draft safe- harbor policy calls for rejecting safe-harbor agree- ments that could backfire. Safe harbors have not yet been widely tested. How well they will work remains to be seen. Prelisting Agreements In a typical prelisting agreement, any federal, state or private entity can negotiate an ESA- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .