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<br />The Upper Basins' Political Conundrum: A Deal is Not a Deal <br />were imbued with an urgent sense of effecting national social and economic <br />purposes and experimenting with various models of river basin <br />"governance."los <br />Finally, when the United States entered World War II, there were a large <br />number of public works projects for irrigation, flood control, navigation, and <br />hydropower generation which had been authorized. However, work on these <br />projects was suspended, or not initiated, unless their completion would <br />contribute to the war effort. <br />Given the impacts of the 1930s drought on agriculture, the out migration <br />caused by the Depression and the war, and the need to provide jobs for <br />returning soldiers at war's end, upper and lower basin interests alike, as well <br />as government planners and members of Congress, began as early as 1942 to <br />look ahead to reinstituting the development of federal water projects after the <br />war as a means of providing jobs and economic stability for the Missouri River <br />Basin. In order to achieve this shared goal, upper and lower basin interests <br />understood the need to cooperate politically. <br />Recognizing the perceived urgency and the 'joint community interest" <br />throughout the basin, South Dakota Governor Merrill Q. Sharpe pointed <br />out that the special interests would "have a much better opportunity to <br />obtain development for their mutual benefit if they all acted together under <br />the direction of some kind of steering or executive or liaison committee." <br />The development advocates foresaw the political advantages of pooling <br />efforts to request plan authorization and appropriations from Congress. <br />... Although the states had varying interests in the basin's water resources, <br />they constituted a powerful political network.llo <br />The result was the formation of the Missouri River States Committee in May <br />of 1943 for the purpose of promoting the states' joint interests in the <br />comprehensive and integrated development of the water resources of the <br />basin. This much the upper and lower basin interests could agree upon. But, <br />the devil is always in the details. <br />109 For example, the grand experiment of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) emerged <br />from this period. Indeed, legislation to create a Missouri Valley Authority modeled after the <br />TVA was also considered by Congress in the late 1930s and early 1940s, but never enacted. <br />Id. at 73-86. <br />llo Id. at 10-11. Footnote omitted. <br />36 <br />1 <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br />i. <br />1 <br /> <br /> <br /> <br />