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<br />The Upper Basins' Political Conundrum: A Deal is Not a Deal <br />2. Interstate Compacts <br />The Compact Clause of the U.5. Constitution recognizes, by negative <br />implication, the power of the states to negotiate interstate agreements, <br />subject to the consent of Congress: <br />No state shall, without the consent of Congress ... enter into any agreement <br />or compact with another state, or with a foreign power ...." <br />Such compacts are binding on the signatory states and on the individual <br />citizens of the compacting states. <br />One of the virtues of an interstate compact is that it allows the signatory <br />parties: <br />... to allocate unappropriated water, thus making a 'present appropriation <br />for future use. " Ability to make these determinations in advance is crucial <br />to long range water project planning.18 <br />In the context of this paper, this observation is particularly relevant to the <br />Colorado River Basin. It was concern on the part of upper basin states about <br />the rapid pace of development in California versus the slow pace of <br />development in the upper basin, coupled with the U.S. Supreme Court's <br />decision to apply the doctrine of prior appropriation in the 1922 decision in <br />Wyoming v. Colorado, that prompted the upper basin states to consummate <br />the negotiation of the Colorado River Compact later that year, the history of <br />which negotiations will be chronicled in the next section of this paper. From <br />the perspective of upper basin water development interests, an interstate <br />compact was desirable because it would allocate to them "in perpetuity" for <br />future use then unappropriated and unused waters of the upper basin,ls <br />" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. <br />1e D. GETCHES, supra note 5, at 407. <br />19 Whether western states can indeed rely on interstate compacts to achieve protection "in <br />perpetuity" as against the future actions of Congress is a legal and policy issue which is far <br />beyond the scope of this paper. Insofar as the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause <br />of the U.S. Constitution may be concerned, see, e.g., Carlson and Boles, Contrary View of the <br />Law of the Colorado River: An Examination of Rivalries Between the Upper and Lower Basins, <br />in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-SECOND ANNUAL ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL <br />LAW INSTITUTE 21-28 - 21-29 (1986) ("Congress probably possesses the power under the <br />commerce clause ... to modify an interstate compact by statute."). However, with respect to <br />the issue of whether it is permissible for federal environmental regulatory laws to adversely <br />impact a state's ability to develop and consume waters allocated to it by an interstate compact, <br />the analysis turns on considerably more than just the Commerce Clause. <br /> <br />8 <br />