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<br />evolve over time, get fleshed out here and there, and
<br />continually evolve. It's a work in progress, the
<br />Compact plus the other parts of the Law of the River.
<br />There's some notable silences in the Compact,
<br />probably some intentional, some not. The Compact
<br />is silent on marketing, for example, and interstate or
<br />interbasin transfers of water. We now argue about
<br />that issue in terms of the Compact's definition of
<br />"beneficial consumptive use," which, by the way, is
<br />not defined in the Compact - there's a silence, a
<br />particularly interesting silence for you. It's silent on
<br />water quality, which also has some modern reverbera-
<br />tions. It's silent on groundwater which, in particular
<br />parts of the basin, is an emerging issue.
<br />Furthermore, the Compact's basic working
<br />assumption that state law controls water rights was
<br />subject to some exceptions that were acknowledged in
<br />the Compact itself. One is international obligations
<br />that have already been mentioned. That was carried
<br />out in a 1944 treaty with Mexico and in a 1973
<br />Minute on Water Quality, both of which have
<br />important implications for basin water management.
<br />The Compact acknowledged the federal
<br />government's obligations to Indian reserved rights-
<br />although it didn't use the word "reserved rights" - but
<br />the Winters case, the foundation for those Indian
<br />rights, had been decided 14 years earlier. The
<br />Compact drafters clearly knew about it, although it is
<br />also fair to say that the standard for quantifying those
<br />rights was not really known at the time and wasn't
<br />really known until 35 years later in Arizona v.
<br />California. That case in 1963 also made clear that
<br />there were other federal reserved rights in the basin
<br />with respect to non-Indian federal reservations.
<br />The Compact, as has already been mentioned, was
<br />written against the backdrop of pending legislation in
<br />Congress to authorize the Boulder Canyon Project
<br />Act. As we heard Dave Kennedy say, obviously one of
<br />California's very strong interests here was in putting
<br />in place an interstate arrangement that would allow
<br />that project to go forward. Again, we didn't know it
<br />at the time, but six years after the Compact passed,
<br />the Boulder Canyon Project Act was adopted by
<br />Congress, and 35 years after that, as Jerry Muys
<br />mentioned, the Supreme Court rewrote the Boulder
<br />Canyon Project Act in a way that put the secretary of
<br />the Interior fully in charge of Lower Basin water,
<br />both along the river and in the Lower Basin states.
<br />Congress not only allocated the waters of the Lower
<br />Basin among the three states in 1928, so the Supreme
<br />Court said in 1963, but also gave the secretary power
<br />to contract under the Boulder Canyon Project Act
<br />that really overshadowed state law.
<br />How the secretary went about implementing that
<br />power to contract in the Boulder Canyon Project Act
<br />
<br />is worth mentioning because it has some modern
<br />resonance. What the secretary did was go to Califor-
<br />nia and say, "I can contract for water, but I want the
<br />state's recommendations on who I should contract
<br />with, and in what amounts." That resulted in the
<br />state of California and its warring interests coming
<br />together in the seven-party agreement of 1931, which
<br />is one of the foundation documents in the Law of the
<br />River. And that idea of the secretary setting a pattern
<br />here of going to the states, actually asking for
<br />recommendations - but being prepared with certain
<br />federal power to forge an agreement - is something
<br />that is still being talked about.
<br />It's also noteworthy, by the way, that 15 years after
<br />the Supreme Court in Arizona v. California rewrote
<br />the Boulder Canyon Project Act and put the secretary
<br />in charge of the Lower Basin and the lower river, the
<br />Supreme Court came back to the whole subject of
<br />state-federal relations and reclamation law in Califor-
<br />nia v. the United States and rewrote several of its
<br />earlier opinions on Section VIII. But the interesting
<br />thing is Justice
<br />Rehnquist in that
<br />case went quite out
<br />of his way to
<br />reaffirm and
<br />reconfirm the
<br />notion that the
<br />lower Colorado
<br />
<br />
<br />I think it's useful to
<br />
<br />
<br />FEDERAL
<br />AND STATE
<br />ISSUES
<br />
<br />think of the Compact as
<br />
<br />a kind of a constitution.
<br />
<br />- John Leshy
<br />
<br />River was unique,
<br />and that the
<br />secretary of the Interior remained in charge of the
<br />lower Colorado River, and none of the rewriting
<br />the Court was doing in California v. US. would
<br />change that.
<br />The other major area of federal interest, again
<br />following on the Boulder Canyon Project Act, was
<br />more federal projects. This is what Jeff Fassett and
<br />others talked about - federal money and having the
<br />federal mother-in-law along with it. Federal money
<br />has been involved in numerous projects throughout
<br />the basin, most of them in the Upper Basin, autho-
<br />rized by a whole handful of acts, some of them not
<br />built - or not yet built, anyway - and I'm sure we'll
<br />hear more about that.
<br />It's also interesting to note that one of the first
<br />Arizona v. California Supreme Court decisions, back
<br />in 1931, was the first time the Court ever invoked the
<br />commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution to justify
<br />the authority of Congress to build multi-purpose
<br />projects that really had nothing to do with naviga-
<br />tion. And out of that constitutional step forward
<br />came the whole idea that the federal government
<br />could constitutionally build projects throughout
<br />the basin.
<br />
<br />SYMPOSIUM
<br />PROCEEDINGS
<br />MAY 1997
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