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<br />about came out of their chairs because you could see <br />the Compact just collapsing right then and there in <br />the 22nd meeting. I think, fortunately for the <br />Compact, Hoover came to Carpenter's defense and <br />told Hamale that that reservation of rights clause was <br />not going to be in the Compact. Hoover said <br />basically that Hamale's suggestion would, in essence, <br />destroy the fundamental basis of the Compact, which <br />was an allocation of unappropriated rights - a right <br />of future use to the states. And so that didn't get into <br />the Compact. <br />But the Compact did, in fact, deal with a number <br />of federal rights, and I think driven by this exchange <br />of views in that 22nd meeting. Article VIII, as I <br />talked about before, vested all prior perfected rights. <br />Articles III(a) and III(b), as I mentioned, allocated <br />the right of future consumptive use to the states. <br />Article III(c) reserved the United States treaty <br />obligations to Mexico, but specified how those rights <br />might be satisfied - perhaps not with the clarity that <br />some of us might wish. Article VII left open the <br />question of tribal reserved rights, although in my <br />view, it made clear that those rights come out of the <br />basin in which those tribal rights are used for <br />compact allocation purposes. Article IV basically <br />stated and confirmed that the river was not navigable, <br />in fact, but reserved the right to Congress to disavow <br />that disclaimer if it wanted. And finally, Article IV(c) <br />specifically left to the states regulation of rights and <br />the allocation of water within those states. Carpenter, <br />by that paragraph, clearly achieved what he sought in <br />terms of preserving state autonomy to regulate water. <br />He wanted to avoid the interstate application of the <br />prior appropriation doctrine - he strongly felt that it <br />should apply in-state - and I think he accomplished <br />that. <br />Hamale later came back testifying before Congtess <br />on the Boulder Canyon Project Act and asserted that <br />Congress should include the reservation of federal <br />rights clause in there. And again, he lost on that issue. <br />The 1928 Boulder Canyon Project Act specifically <br />and very clearly subjects the rights of the federal <br />government to the provisions of the Compact. It <br />gives the states an official advisory role with regard to <br />the activities of the secretary ofInterior under the act, <br />and it specifically disclaims any interference with the <br />rights of the states to develop laws for their internal <br />regulation. <br />Avoiding litigation clearly was the fourth goal of <br />Carpenter's, and I think it was likewise a goal of each <br />of the states. We're firmly committed to negotiating <br />issues rather than litigating among ourselves. I think <br />we all realize the mess that we would get ourselves <br />into if we had interstate litigation on the Colorado <br />River. <br /> <br />Finally, Carpenter and others had a vision about <br />comprehensive development. It's clear from the <br />Compact discussions when you look at the minutes <br />that they discussed what the delivery obligations <br />might be - whether there should be minimums from <br />the Upper Basin. I think there was a clear, implicit <br />understanding that there would have to be develop- <br />ment in the Upper Basin in order to allow the Upper <br />Basin to meet the 10-year rolling average. There was <br />no one-year minimum that was established. It was <br />clear that the Upper Basin could deliver zero water in <br />anyone year, although gravity, I think, would prevent <br />that from happening. <br />But as long as the <br />Upper Basin makes the <br />10-year rolling average, <br />that's what we make. <br />But the comprehensive <br />reservoir development <br />was necessary in order <br />to provide that water <br />on a sustainable basis. <br />The view was <br />underscored again in <br />the Boulder Canyon <br />Project Act which <br />authorized the secretary <br />of Interior to make a <br />comprehensive <br />investigation about <br />water development opportunities in all of the basin <br />states. It clearly authorized Hoover Dam and the AlI- <br />American Canal, but also contemplated this overall <br />investigation that later resulted in the 1956 Colorado <br />River Storage Project Act and the 1968 Colorado <br />River Basin Project Act. <br />What were the things that the negotiators didn't <br />anticipate? We talked about water supply. I went <br />through the exercise of preparing a chart in the paper <br />that compares what I felt the negotiators in 1922 <br />were looking at in terms of water supply vs. what we <br />now know. And it was an interesting exercise - I had <br />a number of conversations with Wayne Cook about <br />what the numbers would be. One of the things I <br />learned was that there were numbers allover the place <br />- then and now. And when you look at the numbers <br />after the negotiation, I think there was a little bit of <br />puffing going on when the negotiators went back to <br />their states and tried to convince the state legislatures <br />to ratify the Compact, because they all came back <br />saying, "Don't worry, plenty of water surplus. We <br />can do it." It's pretty clear now we're close to what <br />the water supply is, given the uses that are now in <br />the basin, depending on what hydrology you want <br />to use. <br /> <br /> <br />I think that the <br /> <br /> <br />STATES' <br />PERSPECTIVES <br /> <br />Compact will continue <br /> <br />to serve as a basis for <br /> <br />negotiation between <br /> <br />the states on the issues <br /> <br />that we face in the <br /> <br />future. <br /> <br />- James Lochhead <br /> <br />SYMPOSIUM <br />PROCEEDINGS <br />MAy 1997 <br /> <br />o <br />