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<br /> <br />THE <br />S Il VE R <br />FOX <br /> <br />ers equitably. For him, diplomacy, patience, tact were <br />the sine qua non of successful negotiations. When <br />Phil Swing and Hiram Johnson introduced legislation <br />for immediate construction of a dam at Boulder <br />Canyon three months before we met in this building, <br />Carpenter expressed his disappointment. Not at the <br />bills - but at their lack of courtesy. <br />This equity to which he aspired could not be <br />achieved without the collection of accurate data - <br />complete consideration of all facts and conditions in <br />each case. It required time. Compact negotiations <br />were doomed to failure, he believed, if they began <br />without ample information or if commissioners felt <br />they were being rushed. Patience would produce <br />trust. Any desire for speed could cloud or encumber <br />the real progress to be made. <br />Similarly, time was needed to allow the states to <br />ratify the Compact once it was signed. When <br />Arizona's Legislature <br />stalled and the other <br />states wanted to take <br />her to court to force <br />ratification of the <br />Compact, it was <br />Carpenter, however, <br />who expressed <br />tolerance for the <br />political storm <br />sweepmg over <br />Arizona. On <br />Arizona's behalf, he argued that 10 to 15 years might <br />be necessary to complete a seven state agreement. <br />He wasn't off by much. <br />Time was especially important to Mr. Carpenter <br />in another sense. He wanted a compact that would <br />allow the Upper Basin a sufficient interval to match <br />the more rapid growth in the Lower Basin. He <br />estimared that it would take from 50 to 200 years <br />for the upper states to fully develop. It was a theme <br />he repeated frequently because he did not want a <br />compact that would require reapportionment of <br />what was then believed to be surplus water before <br />the Upper Basin had a chance to fully mature <br />economically. <br />As much as he supported California's request for <br />a dam at Boulder Canyon, he was sure that the <br />opportunity to develop and prosper would never <br />come to the Upper Basin if construction were to <br />begin prior to signing a compact. It was a theme he <br />repeated over and over again in Santa Fe and at other <br />interstate stream compact negotiations. <br />Because of its permanence, a compact would <br />provide assurance to private developers. Without a <br />compact, development would proceed ar the behest <br />of the Reclamation Service and the Federal Power <br /> <br />Compact negotiations <br />were doomed to failure, <br /> <br />SYMPOSIUM <br />PROCEEDINGS <br />MAY 1997 <br /> <br />o <br /> <br />he believed, if they <br />began without ample <br /> <br /> <br />information. <br /> <br />Commission, both of which were already planning <br />projects on the lower Colorado without awaiting an <br />orderly settlement of rights by the states. If works on <br />the lower Colorado were built prior to a compact, the <br />Upper Basin states would face what he called a <br />"servitude" - an undefined and illegitimate obligation <br />to deliver water to the Lower Basin because of <br />priority rights established by use. "Nations went to <br />war over illegal servitudes," he warned. States in the <br />United States initiated the equivalent of war in the <br />Supreme Court. The prime objective of the Colorado <br />River Commission, therefore, was to settle and <br />advance those matters which would otherwise be <br />brought into court. <br />Mexico - the fact that Mexico was a legitimate <br />user of Colorado River water complicated matters. <br />According to what Carpenter perceived as interna- <br />tionallaw in 1922, the United States had a right to <br />divert all the water originating within its boundaries <br />regardless of the priorities or necessities of down- <br />stream Mexico, period! <br />The commissioners, however, decided to leave <br />Mexico's claims completely out of compact negotia- <br />tions, and agreed unanimously to expunge from the <br />record any debate on Mexico. At the same time, <br />Carpenter felt that he could not consistently argue <br />the doctrine of equitable apportionment for part of <br />the river without applying the same principles to the <br />entire basin. In the six months prior to the Santa Fe <br />gathering, he had studied a treaty between Egypt and <br />the Sudan, and he had interviewed the United States <br />representative to the International Commission on <br />the Nile River, looking for situations that paralleled <br />the relationship between Mexico and the United <br />States. What he learned specifically is unclear. But his <br />emphasis on viewing the Colorado River as a whole, <br />including the Gila River, and administering the entire <br />basin with due regard to generations unborn suggests <br />that he was influenced by these international studies. <br />One cannot complete these remarks without <br />commenting on the fanatical bias Carpenter held <br />toward federal intervention in the domain of states' <br />rights. Experience on the Rio Grande and North <br />Platte had led him to believe that the Reclamation <br />Service was violating its charge - the charge given to <br />it in the Newlands Act to work under state law and to <br />protect state sovereignty. "The breach of this pledge <br />has been the root of great evil," he wrote. "The <br />unrighteous doctrine of federal usurpation of state <br />jurisdiction manifested by the government's claim to <br />ownership of unappropriated Western water was <br />simply shocking." And it made the Reclamation <br />Service appear to be childish and despotic. <br />In addition to defining the respective jurisdictions <br />of the states and the United States, assuring peace and <br />