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<br /> <br />THE <br />S Il VE R <br />FOX <br /> <br />Carpenter at that time had already urged President <br />Harding to appoint a federal representative with <br />international experience and national stature. <br />"Compact negotiations would fail," he said, "if the <br />man representing the United States was a bureaucrat <br />and not a statesman." He feared that Harding might <br />allow the Reclamation Service to choose one of their <br />own people. But the president surprised him by <br />selecting Herbert Hoover, secretary of Commerce, <br />whose international reputation was already well <br />established. Hoover called for a meeting in Washing- <br />ton early in January, and although Carpenter found <br />the atmosphere in Washington much freer and active <br />than it had been under a previous administration, he <br />was very disturbed by what he called "Hoover's <br />imperious tone." "Colorado law under which I was <br />appointed," he wired Hoover, "provides that the <br />governor of Arizona, Tom Campbell, president of the <br />League of the Southwest, call the first meeting of the <br />Interstate Commission <br />and commissioners of <br />seven states who <br />recently agreed upon a <br />tentative date for call <br />as of Phoenix in the <br />latter part of January." <br />But Carpenter's <br />petulance evaporated <br />when he met Hoover <br />in person a few days <br />before the first <br />meeting. By the time all the commissioners had <br />gotten together in Washington, Carpenter had <br />successfully advocated Hoover's election as chairman, <br />and Hoover had returned the favor by recognizing <br />Carpenter's role in founding the Commission and <br />persuading the president and congress to approve <br />authorizing legislation. <br />Harmony on that Commission in Washington did <br />not prevail for very long. In a preliminary attempt to <br />divide up the Colorado River on the basis of poten- <br />tially or practicably irrigable acreage, each commis- <br />sioner, including Carpenter, exaggerated the amount <br />of land that would be irrigated in the future. On the <br />basis of rhese estimates, the river would be bankrupt <br />in short order. Hoover failed to achieve an agreement. <br />Existing data proved inadequate. Mistrust and <br />suspicion proliferated. <br />While California Congressman Phil Swing <br />challenged the commissioners to move forward <br />systematically and scientifically with construction of <br />dams and reservoirs as if the river's development were <br />another Panama Canal, representatives from the <br />Upper Basin demanded assurance that construction <br />of a dam in Boulder Canyon would not jeopardize <br /> <br />It would be the <br /> <br />height of crime to the <br /> <br />SYMPOSIUM <br />PROCEEDINGS <br />MAY 1997 <br /> <br />o <br /> <br />people who sent us <br /> <br /> <br />here to adjourn <br />permanently now. <br /> <br />future rights of the origin states. Carpenter extended <br />this demand even further in Washington. Convinced <br />that the four states of origin would never be able to <br />beneficially use even an equitable part of the waters <br />rising and flowing within the respective territories of <br />each, he asked the commissioners to consider a <br />compact in which the upper states had no limitations <br />placed on them and the lower states could claim no <br />preferred right of title to the use of Colorado River <br />water following the building of dams and reservoirs. <br />Voting on a subsequent motion by Commissioner <br />Norviel, it soon became apparent that the commis- <br />sioners had divided into two groups: the four Upper <br />Basin states vs. the three Lower Basin states. Hoover <br />wondered if the two groups were too far apart for <br />further deliberations. He was inclined to suspend the <br />meeting then and there. Others echoed his fears. <br />Mr. Carpenter refused to throw in the towel. <br />"We are here with a pretty sacred trust," he asserted, <br />"and it should not be treated lightly. In the months <br />and weeks to come many small matters of difference <br />can be argued out. This, to me, has been a very <br />profitable conference, and there is more nearly an <br />approach to a common accord than I had expected <br />when I arrived in Washington. It would be the height <br />of crime to the people who sent us here to adjourn <br />permanently now." <br />Somewhat reluctantly, Mr. Hoover agreed. He <br />suggested meeting later on in the spring to have <br />hearings beginning in the Southwest, which would <br />srart in Phoenix and go to California and come back <br />to Utah, Grand Junction, Denver and Cheyenne. <br />They lasted from March 15 to April 2, 1922. What <br />Hoover was hoping for was the emergence of a bona <br />fide leader who would come up with a position that <br />would allow the states - all seven of them - to <br />abandon their defensive posturing. <br />By the end of the Cheyenne meeting, Hoover <br />thought he had his man. Right after rhe Supreme <br />Court decision of June 5, 1922, in the Wyoming <br />case, Hoover asked Carpenter to prepare a compact <br />based on the 50-50 allocation of the water supply of <br />the Colorado River. Although he was extremely <br />pressed with ongoing negotiations with New Mexico <br />and Nebraska involving the South Platte and the La <br />Plata rivers, Carpenter managed to send off a <br />compact draft to Hoover in August. Whether he <br />believed it or not, he later told California's McClure <br />that the Wyoming verdict made his work on the <br />Colorado River much easier. "The decision stands," <br />he told McClure, "as a precedent for the principle of <br />fixing the future rights of the states by allocation of <br />the water supply of the stream between them. I feel <br />greatly relieved and my work much lightened." What <br />he meant was that a permanent compact based on <br />