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<br />cheap water is playing out in the Lower Basin. In the <br />past dozen years, municipal purveyors foreseeing <br />shortfalls as early as the first decade of the new <br />millennium began to devise mechanisms to reallocate <br />water. The essential mechanism that has evolved <br />during this time period is the transfer of water <br />resulting from the voluntary reduction in use. <br />There are two models. One, is a salvage model. <br />That's where the right holder who uses less, either by <br />conservation or even fallowing, retains the right to <br />that increment that is not being used and assigns or <br />leases that increment. The second model is what I <br />think is generally termed a forbearance model. That's <br />where the right holder, by pre-arrangement, refrains <br />from using a certain amount of water, allowing <br />another party who also has rights in that same source, <br />to consume it instead. Now each of these models can <br />be combined with storage and, in most cases, <br />obviously that's preferred. <br />These models over the last 12 years have involved <br />transactions between public agencies involving large <br />blocks of water. Witness the first major transaction in <br />the last '80s: The IID- Metropolitan 106,000 acre- <br />feet per year transaction. In the early '90s, there was <br />the Palo Verde- Met pilot project involving landown- <br />ers in the Palo Verde District. In the early '90s, there <br />also was the pilot project that Met and the Southern <br />Nevada Water Authority had with the Central <br />Arizona Water Conservation District storing water. <br />Then, of course, there is the big grand daddy that is <br />planned - the 200,000 acre-feet per year transfer <br />between lID and the San Diego County Water <br />Authority, the negotiations surrounding which are <br />still ongoing. Finally, of course, on behalf of my <br />client, I want to note the e:lCpected storage of ground- <br />water in central Arizona that will provide the basis for <br />the Southern Nevada Water Authority to divert water <br />out of Lake Mead once the off-stream storage <br />regulations, which are now at OMB [Office of <br />Management and Budget], are released and issued, <br />and contractual arrangements are negotiated for that <br />storage under Arizona's new groundwater storage <br />program. <br />These models are all to be contrasted with another <br />model that's actually been operating for many decades <br />in Colorado. That is the model relating to Big <br />Thompson Water in the Northern Colorado Conser- <br />vancy District. There you have a centralized location <br />where bidding and asking prices are posted and in <br />which units of water can be transferred in fairly short <br />order. This, in my judgment, is probably the only <br />Colorado River example on the spectrum of market- <br />ing and reallocation that approximates what econo- <br />mists would call marketing. <br /> <br />This panel is going to take that spectrum which, <br />runs from rhis Colorado Big Thompson example, of <br />direct immediate transfers of units of water, to at the <br />other end, forbearance reallocation. They're going to <br />tell you what they like and dislike about particular <br />examples along that spectrum. <br /> <br />DENNIS UNDERWOOD, <br />EXECUTIVE AsSISTANT TO THE GENERAL <br />MANAGER ON COLORADO RIvER ISSUES, <br />METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF <br />SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA <br /> <br />I've had some previous titles, Commissioner, <br />Director, now it's a very long title. I have concluded <br />that the length of your title is inversely proportional <br />to the amount of authority and power that you have. <br />Before I start, I would like to state my biases. <br />Some of my comments today will be drawn from my <br />past lives, not necessarily my present life. Those biases <br />are: I'm a strong <br />advocate for state <br />rights, but I recognize <br />that there is need for a <br />federal presence and <br />role on the Colorado <br />River. I believe we have <br />an obligation to <br />provide water at the <br />lowest possible cost. I <br />believe public interest <br />crosses agency bound- <br />aries. Our economic <br />and environmental <br />well-being are insepa- <br />rable. And I have a <br />strong confidence in the Law of the River and its <br />ability to evolve to address issues. <br />I'm also going to make a few comments about <br />water as a commodity, as a prelude to my discussions <br />relative to the Colorado. I think you'll agree that <br />water is not in the true sense a commodity. You don't <br />really have absolute ownership. In any state constitu- <br />tion, generally, it's limited to the right to use. It's not <br />yours to misuse; it's not yours to waste. The user has <br />inherent stewardship responsibilities while the water <br />is in his or her control. Your right is limited to <br />beneficial use. Why? Because there's no substitute for <br />water. It's essential for life. It determines our environ- <br />mental quality and well-being, our existence, quality <br />of life and our ability to prosper. Our environmental <br />and economic well-beings are interdependent. <br />I think it's also important to note, as was pointed <br />out in the panel before, that portions of our waters <br /> <br /> <br /> <br />WATER <br />MARKETING <br />ON THE <br />COLORADO <br />RIVER <br /> <br />I'm a strong advocate <br /> <br />for state rights, but I <br /> <br />recognize that there <br /> <br />is need for a federal <br /> <br />presence and role on <br /> <br />the Colorado River. <br /> <br />- Dennis Underwood <br /> <br />SYMPOSIUM <br />PROCEEDINGS <br />SEPTEMBER 1999 <br /> <br />o <br />